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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD
PERPLEXING QUESTIONS ABOUT THREE BASIC FOURTH
AMENDMENT ISSUES: FOURTH AMENDMENT ACTIVITY, PROBABLE




For a criminal procedure enthusiast, the Su-
preme Court's 1977 term added few "new stories
to the temples of constitutional law."' Nevertheless,
the term was important. The decisions this term
should finally put to rest, if this has not already
been done, the simplistic and inaccurate view of
the present Court as an uncompromising champion
of law enforcement interests. 2 Result-oriented ideo-
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. Visiting
Professor of Law, Cornell University, 1978-79 (Term 1).
The author wishes to thank Professor Yale Kamisar of
the University of Michigan Law School who supplied
many helpful comments on a draft of the article. The
author, of course, accepts responsibility for the views
expressed in this article.
' Douglas v.Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting).
2 For an excellent study demonstrating the inaccuracy
of this criticism of the Court, see Israel, Criminal Procedure,
The Burger Court, And the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75
MicH. L. REv. 1320 (1977). But cf. Hartman, Supreme
Court Review (1974)-Foreword: The Burger Court-1973
7"em: Leaving the Sixties Behind Us, 65 J. CRIMN. L. & C: 437
(1974) (referring disapprovingly to the "Burger Court"
as a "champion of law and order"); Skinner, Supreme Court
Review (1976)-Foreword: A New Balance, 67 J. CraM. L.
& C. 365 (1976) (approvingly observing that the Court
has moved away from the "liberalism" of the Warren
years).
The legal analysis of Supreme Court cases would be
advanced by dropping political descriptions of the Court
and its decisions. For one thing, political labels like liberal
and conservative frequently have little meaning in con-
stitutional analysis. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S.
Ct. 1816 (1978), for example, the United States Chamber
of Commerce and the American Conservative Union
filed amicus briefs on behalf of the company supporting
the need for a search warrant in OSIHA inspections while
the Sierra Club and the Friends of the Earth filed an
amicus supporting the government. The "liberal" fourth
amendment position was thus taken by the "conserva-
tive" advocates, and this position prevailed with the
support of the "liberal" Justice Marshall.
logues on both sides of the spectrum will have to
discriminate carefully in hailing or lamenting the
Court's work product this term.3 For example, the
Court declined an invitation to limit further the
right to counsel at identification procedures.4 In-
stead, it "extended" s the right to preindictment
Furthermore, the fallacy of a solid "Burger" block
should now be apparent. In Barlo,'s, id., Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell adopted the "liberal" consti-
tutional but "conservative" political position, while Jus-
tices Blackmun and Rehnquist went the other way. In
Franks v. Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978), on the other
hand, Justice Blackmun wrote the decision permitting
defendants to challenge the truthfulness of statements in
search warrant affidavits, while the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist dissented. Given this reality of individ-
ual judgment on the Court, the cartoon by Ilerblock, in
response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 98 S. Ct. 1970
(1978) (allowing search pursuant to warrant of newspa-
per office rather than requiring a subpoena) can only be
described as a cheap shot. The cartoon, featured in TIME
MAGAZINE, June 12, 1978. at 101, depicts former Presi-
dent Nixon standing with a victory salute behind his four
appointees, each wearing a label describing him as a
"Nixon Justice."
These extended remarks may seem to belabor, the
obvious, but experience in Criminal Procedure and Con-
stitutional Law classes has convinced me that far too
many students view both the Court and its decisions in
an unanalytic, political manner. Sadder yet, this ap-
proach is frequently encouraged, deliberately or unwit-
tingly, by faculty. See, e.g., Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v.
New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic
of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971),
an excellent article with an unfortunate title that conveys
much the same message as the Herblock cartoon.
3 This is not something new this term. Compare Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (limiting habeas
corpus) with Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)
(establishing a new role for the sixth amendment right to
counsel in certain interrogation contexts).
" Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, (1977).
r In United States v. Wade, :388 U.S. 218 (1967), the
Court first applied the sixth amendment right to counsel
to lineups. Wade involved a postindictment lineup. In
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972), the Court
refused to "extend" this right to precharge identification
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stages6 and to one-person showups7 while reaffirm-
ing the exclusionary rule in the context of identi-
fication evidence.8 Similarly ruling for defendants,
the Court invalidated the Ohio death penalty stat-
ute,9 rejected proposed new exceptions to the search
warrant requirement, 0 and freed even further the
double jeopardy protection from the limitations of
its common law moorings." On the other side,
however, prosecutors also came away with some
significant double jeopardy and search and seizure
victories. 12 The Court further restricted the scope
of the fourth amendment exclusionary remedy, this
time by making it almost impossible to apply the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to a live wit-
ness.'
3 And in a case that certainly warrants careful
procedures. For the view that Kirby did not involve a
question of extension, see Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash:
Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of
Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MicH. L. REv. 717, 725-30
(1974).
"The identification in Moore occurred at a judicial
hearing that can best be described as a combination
preliminary arraignment and preliminary examination.
Since the Court had just recently applied the sixth
amendment right to counsel to police interrogation oc-
curring after the preliminary arraignment, Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), it could not with intellec-
tual honesty have limited the right to counsel to postin-
dictment lineups. See also note 5 supra.
7 Until Moore, none of the Court's right to counsel cases
had involved a showup. An extreme formalist could say
that the lineup cases, see note 5 supra, did not dictate the
result in case.s involving a showup. Cf. United States v.
Ash, 413 U.S. 632 (1973) (refusing to apply the lineup
cases to photographic identifications). For a criticism of
Ah, see Grano, supra note 5, at 759-71.
" Only Justice Rehnquist expressed a desire to re-ex-
amine at some point the exclusionary rule in this context.
434 U.S. at 232 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
The search and seizure cases are the topic of this
article.
" See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978) Ujeop-
ardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn).
Isee, e.g., Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978)
(master's hearing and review by juvenile court do not
constitute separate trials for double jeopardy purposes);
United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978) (government
can appeal dismissal during trial granted at defendant's
request).
' United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
Writing for the Court,Justice Rehnquist refused to adopt
a per se rule barring the exclusion of a witness' testimony.
Chief Justice Burger would have gone this far. Given the
conflicting goals of convicting the guilty and deterring
unconstitutional police conduct, Ceccolini arguably
achieved a correct balance. Nevertheless, the Court's
assertion that free will has something to do with the
purposes, and thus proper scope, of the exclusionary rule
was not totally convincing: "The greater the willingness
analysis, the Court found prosecutorial threats of
more severe punishment virtually indistinguishable
from promises of leniency as permissible induce-
ments for guilty pleas. 4
More pragmatically, the 1977 term produced
some decisions that should have a favorable impact
on the actual day-to-day operations of the criminal
justice system. Most significantly, perhaps, the
Court recognized a right of representation by sep-
arate counsel in joint trials, at least where counsel
advises the court that joint representation could
create a conflict of interest. 15 By holding that an
involuntary confession, unlike a confession ob-
tained in violation of Miranda, cannot be used for
any purpose, 16 the Court reminded suppression
hearing judges that separate voluntariness and Mi-
randa rulings should be made with respect to each
challenged confession. Similarly, by carefully re-
examining the manifest necessity doctrine, the
Court for the first time provided some concrete
guidelines that should better enable trial judges to
predict the double jeopardy ramifications of mis-
trial declarations. 1
of the witness to freely testify, the greater the likelihood
that he or she will be discovered by legal means and,
concomitantly, the smaller the incentive to conduct an
illegal search to discover the witness." Id. at 276. Of
course, the police cannot know in advance if an unknown
witness will testify freely.
For a pre-Ceccolini criticism of the "free-will" analysis,
see Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and
Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. R.Ev. 579, 621-24 (1968).
14 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
'5 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The
Court's opinion is consistent with the view advocated by
the American Bar Association. See ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5 (Approved
Draft, 1971). Interestingly, Chief Justice Burger, who
authored Holloway, served as Chairman of the ABA Ad-
visory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Func-
tions. The Court did refuse to adopt a per se rule dis-
pensing with the need to make some minimal showing of
conflict, but the opinion of Justice Powell is certainly
correct in seeing the "seeds of a per se rule" in the Court's
analysis. 435 U.S. at 491. (Powell, J., dissenting).
I' Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978). This
should have been apparent after Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of
Miranda, if otherwise voluntary, may be used for impeach-
ment purposes). The Court also seemed to reaffirm the
rule of automatic reversal in cases where an involuntary
confession is actually used at trial.
17 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Stevens persuasively argued
that the meaning of "necessity" must vary as a function
of the particular reason given in support of a mistrial
declaration. For example, the strictest appellate scrutiny
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The 1977 term most deserves study, however,
from the perspective of doctrinal development: In
the double jeopardy area alone, the Court rendered
eight written opinions and thus continued the av-
alanche that started three years ago. Whether this
sudden interest in double jeopardy has produced
an internally consistent doctrine remains to be
analyzed.' 8 More intriguing than newly emerged
doctrine are the seeds that have fallen, some per-
haps inadvertently, that could blossom into land-
mark decisions in future terms. From this perspec-
tive, the search and seizure cases decided this term
are the most fascinating.
The issues and holdings in the search and seizure
cases were relatively straightforward and, with one
exception, hardly novel. Taking the cases in deci-
sional order, but excluding those that have little
bearing on this article, the Court held in Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms19 that it is "reasonable" for police to
order a lawfully stopped motorist out of the car
even though they lack any articulable suspicion
that the motorist is dangerous. Next,20 toward the
end of the term, the Court in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.2t held that OSHA22 inspectors need a search
warrant when the owner of a business refuses to
consent to a safety inspection. Adhering to Camara
v. Municipal Court,2 the Barlow's Court further
maintained that probable cause can be established
by a showing that reasonable administrative stan-
dards govern the particular inspection. In a similar
decision, the Court held in Michigan v. Tyler' that
fire inspectors seeking to ascertain the cause of a
fire need a warrant when they return to a burned
structure after the fire has been extinguished. The
Court recognized that the fire itself creates an
exigency that permits the warrantless entry of
firefighters, and it also noted that fire officials do
of 'necessity is required when the prosecutor seeks a
mistrial to buttress a weak case. Id. at 507-08.
'8 The Court may be moving too quickly in this area.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978),
where the Court, in a 5-4 opinion, found it necessary to
overrule United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
Justice Rehnquist authored both opinions.
19 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).2oAfter Mimms, the Court decided United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (dealing with the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine) and Scott v. United States,
98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978) (dealing with the minimization
requirement in the wiretap statute and discussing the
relevance of police motive in assessing the constitution-
ality of searches). Neither case is discussed in this article.
2'98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
' Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
23387 U.S. 523 (1967).
2 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
not need a warrant to remain in a burned building
a reasonable time after the fire has been extin-
guished for purposes of investigating its cause.2 5 AS
in Barlow's, the Tyler Court contended that tradi-
tional probable cause need not be shown for a fire
inspection warrant, unless the fire officials are seek-
ing evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.
Recognizing,, however, that investigatory fire
searches are responsive to individual events and
thus different from routine administrative inspec-
tions like those conducted by OSHA, the Court
held that the issuing magistrate should make a
"particularized inquiry," taking into account fac-
tors such as the "number of prior entries, the scope
of the search, the time of day when it is proposed
to be made, the lapse of time since the fire,. the
continued use of the building, and the owner's
efforts to secure it against intruders."
2
While the above cases involved application of
obviously relevant precedent, Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily27 raised a question of first, impression for the
Court. Conceding that the police had probable
cause to believe that evidence of crime would be
found, the Stanford Daily, a student newspaper,
nevertheless claimed that a search of its premises
pursuant to a search warrant was illegal because
the police did not first seek to obtain the evidence
by subpoena. More specifically, the paper con-
tended that the fourth amendment forbids a search
of a person not suspected of crime unless there is
probable cause to believe that a subpoena duces
tecum would be impractical. The Court, however,
rejected this contention and a related contention
that the first amendment warranted this special
protection for the press. Writing for the Court,
Justice White, who also authored Camara in 1967
and the reaffirmation of Camara in Barlou s,28 de-
25 In a somewhat unusual holding, the Court charac-
terized the early morning re-entries of the burned build-
ing, some four or five hours after the officials first left the




27 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).
28 It would be interesting to examine Justice White's
effect on fourth amendment doctrine. He also authored
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) and United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), two cases that this
article argues should be overruled. His dissenting opinion
in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), on the
proper scope of a search incident to arrest, still seems to
'dominate much of his fourth amendment thinking. See,
e.g., the debate between Justices Stewart and White in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), where
Justice White authored a 5-4 opinion that seems difficult
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scribed the lower court's adoption of the paper's
third party search rule as a "sweeping revision" of
the fourth amendment without precedential sup-
port.29 The Court thus held that probable cause
that evidence will be found is a sufficient condition
for a warrant to search third party premises. Jus-
tices Stewart and Marshall dissented on first
amendment gounds, but more interesting for pur-
poses of this article, Justice Stevens filed a lone
dissent in which he framed the issue as one relating
to the kind of probable cause that must be estab-
lished in third party search cases.
In Mincey v. Arizona,30 the Court overturned a
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court that had
recognized a murder scene exception to the warrant
requirement. Reaffirming the now famous "prin-
ciple" that warrantless searches are per se unrea-
sonable unless they fall within "a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions," 3' the
Court concluded that the four day search at issue,
which resulted in the seizure of over two hundred
objects, could not be rationalized under an emer-
gency theory. The Court did allow, however, war-
rantless searches for evidence that can be lost,
destroyed or removed during the time required to
obtain a warrant.32
to square with prior decisions on the search incident to
arrest doctrine. Indeed, the rejected rationale of Justice
White's Chimel dissent seems to underlie the holdings in
Chambers, Edwards, and perhaps even United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Whether he has been
right or wrong in his views, it seems fair to say that his
opinions have resulted in much of the doctrinal uncer-
tainty that permeates search and seizure law.
'2 98 S. Ct. at 1975. Justice White also described the
holding in the lower federal courts as "remarkable." Id.
1979. As this article attempts to demonstrate, Justice
White's opinions in both Camara and Barlow's made such
unusually harsh criticism inappropriate. See section III B
infra.
"0 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978).
3 Id. at 2412. For a persuasive argument that the
warrant exceptions are neither well-delineated nor few,
see Hladdad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and
Food Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 198 (1977).
In Franks v. Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978), the
last search and seizure case of the 1977 term, the Court
held that a defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge
the truthfulness of a search warrant affidavit if he can
make a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement, made intentionally or in reckless disregard of
the truth, was made by the affiant. The Court thus
reversed a Delaware court that had immunized such
affidavits from challenge. Somewhat surprisingly, per-
haps, the preliminary showing requirement, which will
usually be impossible to satisfy, especially in cases where
probable cause is based upon an alleged informant's tip,
did not provoke a dissent. For an argument against the
Though seemingly simple and straightforward,
the above five cases raise questions that go to the
very heart of search and seizure law. While no area
of criminal procedure, with the possible exception
now of double jeopardy, is as complex as search
and seizure, the latter can still fairly Well be orga-
nized around three basic issues: (a) whether certain
conduct constitutes a search or seizure-that is,
whether fourth amendment activity is involved;
(b) whether the fourth amendment activity at issue
requires as justification full traditional probable
cause or, instead, some other degree or kind of
support; (c) whether the fourth amendment activ-
ity at issue requires prior judicial approval.33 Un-
fortunately, the law is in disarray on each of these
basic issues and the cases decided this term may
further cause confusion. Even if the holdings in
each of the five cases were correct-and good
arguments can be made for most of them-the
decisions raise serious questions about previously
decided cases. The broad thesis of this article, then,
is that this term's cases mandate some fundamental
rethinking about some very old and basic questions




A. NEW STATEMENTS ABOUT AN OLD ISSUE
The fourth amendment protects "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.
'
,3 By its terms, therefore, the fourth amend-
ment does not protect against unreasonable gov-
ernmental conduct that cannot be defined as a
search or seizure, and presumably such unreason-
able governmental conduct is constitutionally per-
missible unless it violates some other constitutional
provision, such as the due process clause or the first
amendment.Y In determining over the years what
preliminary showing requirement, see Grano, A Dilemma
for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the
Possibility of Policy Perjury, 1971 U. IL. L.F. 405, 424-27.
Franks will not be further discussed in this article.
' For an outline of the four other major issues that
dominate search and seizure law, see Grano, Criminal
Procedure, 1976 Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 23 WAYNE L.
REv. 517, 519 (1977).
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
: Cf United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)
(grand jury subpoena for voice exemplars did not impli-
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constitutes a search or seizure, the Court has shifted
from emphasizing the security of private property
to emphasizing the security of some aspects of
privacy.3 At one time, for example, putting a tap
on outside telephone lines was not considered a
search, for such a tap neither required the police to
intrude physically into a constitutionally protected
area nor resulted in the taking of any tangible
"effects."' ' In Katz v. United Statesat however, the
Court considered the matter quite differently:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingry exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public may be constitutionally
protected.
To the Katz Court, the government's conduct of
electronically eavesdropping upon a defendant's
telephone conversation "violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied... and thus constituted
a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.'"4
By now, of course, the Katzjustifiable or reason-
able expectation of privacy test41 is familiar to all
who take even the.most rudimentary interest in
cate fourth amendment interests and accordingly did not
have to satisfy "even the minimal requirement of reason-
ableness"). Divni did suggest, however, that due process
concerns would be implicated by a showing that sub-
poenas were being used for harassment. Id. at 12. See also
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1973) (suggesting that
grand jury harassment of the press would implicate first
amendment concerns).
' For an excellent review of both the shift in emphasis
and its philosophical underpinnings, see Note, Formalism,
Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fih Amendments, 90 HAuv. L. Rzv. 945 (1977).
A consideration of what constitutes fourth amendment
activity appears in Y. KArs;SAR, J. GRANO, &J. HADDAD,
Sum AND SuBsrANcE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22-27
(1977).
37 ee Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).




40 i d at 353.
"I The "reasonable expectation of privacy" language
comes from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz.
389 US. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Lower courts
quickly seized upon this language as stating the appro-
priate test, and in post-Katz cases, the Supreme Court
itself used the Harlan formulation. See, e.g., United States
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (grand jury subpoena
ror voice exemplars does not implicate fourth amendment
interests because "no person can have a reasonable ex-
pectation that others will not know the sound of his
voice").
fourth amendment law. Equally familiar, however,
is the doctrinal chaos that this test has created.42
Obviously designed to extend fourth amendment
protections to governmental invasions of security
made possible by technological development and
the growth of modern police forces,43 the test has
been used both to extend constitutional protection
to the most trivial interests" and to withhold, or
withdraw, constitutional protection from interests
that seem basic in a free society 5 That Katz would
be used for both purposes was perhaps inevitable
given the inherent ambiguity in its new test.6
It should cause little surprise, therefore, that the
government in three of the search and seizure cases
this term relied on Katz to suggest an end run
around traditional fourth amendment "reasona-
bleness" requirements. In the most restrained of
the three arguments, the government argued in
Barlow's that "there are areas of a commercial
building in which the owner does not have a ig-
nificant expectation ofprivacy from reasonable, limited-
purpose inspections during business hours.
'
17
Stated in slightly different words, the government
42 For a good discussion of the problem, see Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 356-58, 363-65, 380-409 (1974). See also Peebles,
The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some
Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REv. 75 (1976).
43 See Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy--Katz
v. United States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REv. 468, 475
(1976). For'a prescient forecast of the dangers of elec-
tronic surveillance long before they materialized, see
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Katz, by overruling Olmstead,
encompassed these dangers within the scope of the fourth
amendment.
" It has been held, for example, that the use of sniffing
does constitutes a search. See Peebles, note 42 supra.
Se, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(government subpoena for depositor's bank records); Peo-
ple v. Guerra, 21 Cal. App. 3d 534, 98 Cal. Rptr. 627
(1971) (police press ears to apartment doorway to over-
hear conversations within; court indicates that persons
desiring privacy should whisper). Miller is discussed ex-
tensively in section II B 2 infta.
"' Commentators have been virtually unanimous in
finding the new test ambiguous. See, e.g., Amsterdam,
supra note 42, at 383-86; Comment, Electronic Eavesdrop-
ping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. R-v. 831, 838
(1973); Note, supra note 43, at 471. For an article pre-
dicting the confusion that has surrounded the Katz test,
see Kitch, Katz. v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133 (P. Kurland ed.).
47 Brief for Appellants at 28-29, Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (emphasis added). The argument did
not go to the extreme of contending that the employer
had no expectation of privacy whatsoever. Compare that
argument with the prosecutor's argument in Tyler de-
scribed in the text at notes 59-60 infia.
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argued that OSHA inspections do not "touch upon
interests that implicate 'the essential purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.' "" The rationale for this po-
sition was quite simple:
While the work areas of a conventional factory
housing a legitimate business enterprise may be
closed to the general public ... their routine occu-
pation by the owner's employees and the frequent
visits by those outside parties who deliver materials
for the conduct of the enterprise effectively diminish
any claim of privacy by the factory owner with
respect to such areas---especially vis-a-vis inspectors
whose mission is to insure the health and safety of
the very employees whom the owner has assigned
for his profit to the areas at issue.'
9
The government further reasoned that the perva-
siveness of state and national safety regulations
refutes the view that an employer can have a
"realistic privacy interest" in employee work
areas. 50
In an opinion authored by Justice White, the
Court rejected these arguments. It concluded that
an individual can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy against the government even though such
an expectation may not exist against certain pri-
vate individuals. As Justice White noted:
The critical fact in this case is that entry over Mr.
Barlow's objection is being sought by a Government
agent. Employees are not being prohibited from
reporting OSHA violations. What they observe in
their daily functions is undoubtedly beyond the
employer's reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Government inspector, however, is not an employee.
Without a warrant he stands in no better position
than a member of the public. What is observable
by the public is observable, without a warrant, by
the Government inspector as well .... That an
employee is free to report, and the Government is
free to use, any evidence of noncompliance with
OSHA that the employee observes furnishes no
justification for federal agents to enter a place of
business from which the public is restricted and to
conduct their own warrantless search.5'
a Id. at 29 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 498 (1958)).
49 Id. at 29.
wo Reply Brief for Appellants at 3, Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
5' Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1821-22.
Cf Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964)
(reasoning that although hotel patron gives implied con-
sent to maids and other hotel employees to enter his room
in the performance of their duties, such consent does not
extend to entry by government agents in search of evi-
dence).
The government's argument that pervasive reg-
ulation had severely diminished the reasonableness
of an employer's privacy expectations was more
difficult, and the Court did not handle it as well.
The Court agreed that government can reduce or
negate reasonable expectations of privacy, but it
narrowed the implications of this position by sug-
gesting that a long history of governmental over-
sight and regulation was required to accomplish
such a result.52 This qualification, however, cannot
explain United States v. Biswellss also authored by
Justice White, where the Court just six years ago
found the relative recency of federal firearms reg-
ulation irrelevant. Viewing firearms inspections as
minimally intrusive into justifiable expectations of
privacy, the Biswell Court reasoned that a dealer
knows what to expect upon entering "this perva-
sively regulated business." ' Barlow's is unsatisfac-
tory, therefore, in distinguishing the business in
Biswell as one involving a "long tradition of close
government supervision. ' ' 5 Perhaps appreciating
this, Justice White hedged somewhat by adding
that businessmen in federally licensed and regu-
lated enterprises "accept the burdens as well as the
benefits of their trade, whereas... [Barlow's] was
not engaged in any regulated or licensed
business." 56 But the government had contended
that businesses, especially those affecting interstate
commerce, were indeed subject to pervasive health
and safety regulations. To this Justice White could
52 98 S. Ct. at 1821.
0 40 6 U.S. 311 (1972).
'Id. at 316. A major analytic difficulty in many cases
is the failure to distinguish the question of whether fourth
amendment interests are present from the question of
whether fourth amendment interests are reasonably in-
vaded. Biswell did not question the presence of fourth
amendment interests but instead held that a warrantless
inspection was reasonable under the fourth amendment.
Citing both Biswell and Katz, however, the Barlow's Court
stated that "certain industries have such a history of
government oversight that no reasonable expectation of
privacy.., could exist for a proprietor over the stock of
such an enterprise." 98 S. Ct. at 1821. See also United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751, 753 (1971), holding
that participant monitoring does not implicate fourth
amendment interests but also suggesting, without notic-
ing the inconsistency, that such monitoring is "reasona-
ble" under the fourth amendment. The distinction, of
course, is not just a matter of semantics. To say that
government notice or regulation can negate expectations
of privacy is to say that government can withdraw from
the fourth amendment activity that otherwise would
clearly constitute a search. See Amsterdam, supra note 42,
at 384.
" 98 S. Ct. at 1821.
IdM at 1821 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973)).
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only answer that "the degree of federal involve-
ment in employee working circumstances has never
been of the order of specificity and pervasiveness
that OSHA mandates. 5 7 Unfortunately, this re-
sponse failed to explain why the pervasiveness of
the current OSHA regulations did not reduce or
negate reasonable expectations of privacy. The
response also left unclear whether it is the longevity
or the pervasiveness of government regulation, or
some combination of the two, that ultimately ac-
counts for reduced privacy expectations, and thus
for reduced fourth amendment interestsss
Unlike the government in Barlow's, the prosecu-
tor in Tyler took a mrxch bolder approach to the
Katz question, one that should serve as a "how not
to" model for law students and appellate advo-
cates. A fire, the prosecutor argued, raises two
possibilities: "either the occupant burned his own
premises, or the fire was caused accidentally or by
[third-party] malicious arson. ' 59 The first alterna-
tive, the argument continued, speaks directly to the
occupant's expectation of privacy in his burned
premises: "It says that he has none whatsoever."
'0
The prosecutor conceded that fire investigators
cannot know before their inspection whether the
occupant has burned his premises, but he consid-
ered this irrelevant because "the fact remains that
no constitutional right will have been violated by
such a search."61 With respect to the second alter-
native-accident or third-party arson-the prose-
cutor's argument was equally facile. "Victims," he
maintained, will welcome the investigation and
thus neither need nor -want traditional fourth
57Id 98 S. Ct. at 1821. The Court also noted that few
businesses can be conducted without having some effect
on interstate commerce. It may be that the Court is
finally beginning to see the ramifications of its commerce
doctrine permitting Congress to regulate health and mor-
als, although such areas are not included in the Art. I, §
8 enumerated powers, merely because some de minimus
connection with interstate commerce can be found. See,
e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
Whether the Court will ever deal directly with the com-
merce issue may be doubted. But cf. National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (limiting ability of
Congress to regulate certain state activity under the
commerce clause).
' To argue that the pervasiveness of governmental
regulation alone may reduce legitimate privacy expecta-
tions is to give government a potent weapon to immunize
its conduct from fourth amendment scrutiny. See note 54,
su-pa.
" Petitioner's Brief at 7, Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct.
1942 (1978).
8 Id at 12.
61 Id.
amendment protection.62 Either way, therefore, a
fire inspection does not implicate fourth amend-
ment interests.
The Court, with Justice Stewart writing the
opinion, used little effort in rejecting these argu-
ments. The Court first observed that "victims" do
have "protectable expectations of privacy in what-
ever remains of their property. ' ' 63 The Court rec-
ognized, in addition, that such persons may be
concerned about the time, frequency, and scope of
the inspections.r' Having recognized this, the Court
easily unraveled the rest of the prosecutor's argu-
ment, "for it is of course impossible to justify a
warrantless search on the ground of abandonment
by arson when that arson has not yet been
proved.
'65
Citing Tyler, the Court in Mincey6 summarily
rejected a similar argument that a defendant had
forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy in
his apartment by killing an officer who was at-
tempting to arrest him. The Court simply observed
that such reasoning "would impermissibly convict
the suspect even before the evidence against him
was gathered.0 7
In summary, then, Barlow's, Tyler, and Mincey
helped clarify some important aspects of the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test. First, and
perhaps most important, the Court emphasized
that granting a right of access to third parties does
not necessarily result in a forfeiture of fourth
amendment interests and a concomitant right of
access by government. Indeed, Barlow's indicates
that the relevant question is the individual's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy vis-i-vis the govern-
ment. Second, reasonable expectations of privacy
do not depend upon post facto judgments concern-
ing the individual's guilt or innocence. Thus, the
question of whether the police have engaged in a
fourth amendment search must turn on the nature
of the police intrusion and not on what the police
have uncovered through their endeavors. Finally,
and this is the ambiguous part, government can
pass regulatory laws that defeat what otherwise
would be reasonable expectations of privacy, but
only in exceptional cases will regulatory laws be
permitted to have this effect.
62Id. at 13-16.
63 98 S. Ct. at 1948.
64 Id. at 1948, 1949. The Court made this observation
in the section of its opinion describing the magistrate's
task when a warrant is sought.
6 Id at 1948.
' Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978).
67Id. at 2413.
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B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW STATEMENTS
1. Participant Monitoring Reconsidered
The first two statements in the above summary
may seem rather obvious. Because the fourth
amendment protects citizens from government,
logic and reason would seem to dictate that the
relevant inquiry focus on the expectations that
citizens have about governmental intrusions into
their privacy.68 Lawless citizens may break into our
offices and homes, steal and read our mail, listen-
in on our telephone conversations, and otherwise
reduce both present privacy and our privacy ex-
pectations, but certainly this has nothing to do
with ascertaining what government conduct is sub-
ject to fourth amendment requirements.s Simi-
larly, our deliberate invitations and disclosures to
select individuals seem irrelevant when the ques-
tion is whether the government's forced entry or
compulsory disclosure is regulated by the fourth
amendment.70 The question of whether govern-
"s For an argument persuasively demonstrating the
validity of this view, see Amsterdam, supra note 42, at
406-07.
See id., arguing that although a person may assume
the risk of burglary by parking a car in Greenwich
Village, this hardly suggests that government can break
into the car free of fourth amendment restraints.
'0 On the other hand, if a person's conduct is observ-
able to any person who happens to be in the vicinity, a
privacy expectation can hardly be claimed. Cf Comment,
supra note 46, at 838 ("A democratic society should
demonstrate the same respect for individual privacy that
the reasonable man expects from the general public.")
Barlow's makes clear that there is a constitutional differ-
ence between disclosing information or opening an area
to select individuals and making information or an area
available to any member of the general public. See also
Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416
U.S. 861 (1974) (inspector testing plumes of smoke was
observing what anyone near the plant could see).
One important limitation is necessary. To immunize
conduct from fourth amendment scrutiny, the govern-
ment should make its observations in the same manner
as that available to any member of the public. Thus, if
one engages in illegal conduct in a restroom stall, the
absence of a stall door should be irrelevant to the question
of whether an agent hiding in the ceiling is conducting a
search. See People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232,
106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973). But see Buchanan v. State, 471
S.W.2d 401 (Trex. Crim. App. 1971). Our legitimate
expectations against government, which define what con-
duct will be considered a search, must be assessed against
that very conduct and not some other that government
could have engaged in without violating privacy expec-
tations. To this extent, Katz is misleading when it says
merely that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection." See the text at note 39
supra. (Of course, the quote is also inconsistent with
ment conduct constitutes a search-not the sepa-
rate question of whether the search is rea-
sonable-simply cannot depend upon such mat-
ters.
It must likewise seem obvious that an individ-
ual's guilt or innocence is irrelevant to the question
of whether government conduct constitutes a
search. To conclude otherwise would make it im-
possible to know in advance whether government
conduct is covered by the fourth amendment. The
logic of the rejected arguments in Tyler and Mincey,
for example, would suggest that police are search-
ing when, hidden in a ceiling, they observe "inno-
cent" behavior in a restroom but not when they
observe an illegal sexual act or a narcotics trans-
action. For it is but a short step from the abandon-
ment argument in Tyler and the forfeiture argu-
ment in Mincey to the view that expectations of
privacy are reasonable only when the right to
privacy has not been forfeited by an illegal act.71
While the Court's holdings thus seem to affirm
the obvious, they raise serious questions and re-
newed doubts about the validity of previous cases
dealing with participant monitoring. Participant
monitoring, unlike third party monitoring, involves
the use of a participant spy, an informant or un-
dercover government agent who deals directly with
the person whose conduct or conversations are to
be monitored. 72 The spy may report observations
to other agents, as in Hoffa v. United States,73 secretly
tape record a transaction, as in Osborn v. United
States,74 or secretly transmit radio signals to other
agents not present at the scene, as in United States
v. White.75 The spy may be a trusted friend, as in
Hoffa, or a total stranger, as in Lewis v. United
States.76 Whether bugged or unbugged, friend or
Barlow's, unless it is understood as covering only the
situation in which the activity in the home is observable
by any member of the public.) See also Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964).
7' The prosecutor in Tyler denied that his argument
dictated such a conclusion. Instead, he argued that arson,
unlike other crimes, suggests abandonment. Petitioner's
Brief at 11-12, Tyler v. Michigan, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
The argument in Mincey, of course, could not depend
upon abandonment.
72 Under this definition, Katz is a third-party monitor-
ing case, because the government overheard the conver-
sation without the knowledge or consent of either party.
73 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (defendant's supposed friend,
assumed by the Court to be a government plant, disclosed
conversations in the defendant's hotel suite during a
criminal trial).
74 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
7401 U.S. 745 (1971).
76 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (unbugged agent, who described
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stranger, the participant monitor, the Supreme
Court has ruled, does not implicate fourth amend-
ment interests.
United States v. White is the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on the subject. In
White, an informant with a hidden electronic de-
vice secretly transmitted to other government
agents several conversations with the defendant.
The conversations, relating to narcotics, occurred
in the informant's home and car, in the defendant's
home, and in a restaurant. Because the informant
was unavailable for the defendant's subsequent
trial, the other agents testified about the overheard
conversations. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
White, rejected the defendant's claims that the
electronic surveillance of his conversations violated
his reasonable expectations of privacy-that is,
constituted a search-and thus was unreasonable
absent a valid search warrant. 78 Using a rationale
difficult to reconcile with this term's cases, the
Court could find nothing in Katz to suggest that
an individual has a "constitutionally protected
expectation that a person with whom he is con-
versing will not then or later reveal the conversa-
tion to the police." 79
The Court thus did not appear to recognize that
one's expectations about what government is doing
may legitimately differ from one's expectations
about what associates are or will be doing as private
citizens. Moreover, the Court repeatedly examined
the expectation of privacy question from the per-
spective of a "wrongdoer." Quoting Hoffa, the
Court indicated that the fourth amendment "af-
fords no protection to 'a wrongdoer's misplaced
himself as "Jimmy the Polack," purchased narcotics in
the defendant's home).
77401 U.S. 745 (1971). White was a plurality opinion,
but Justice Black went even further than the plurality in
arguing that words cannot be a subject of fourth amend-
ment protection. The Court has treated White as prece-
dent. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
75 A sentence or two in the opinion misleadingly sug-
gests that warrantless participant bugging is a reasonable
search under the fourth amendment. See note 54 supra
Of course, if such participant bugging constituted fourth
amendment activity, the Court would have had tojustify
the creation of a new exception to the warrant require-
ment. It did not do this, thus reinforcing the primary
emphasis in the opinion that such conduct does not
constitute a search.
Cases like White cannot be read as consent-search
cases. First, the Court's opinion discussed Katz, not the
third-party consent cases. Second, it would be anomalous
to conclude that a search is made legal by the consent of
the government agent conducting the search.
79 401 U.S. at 749.
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily con-
fides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."'0 Building
upon Lewis and Hoffa, which found no fourth
amendment activity in the government's use of
unbugged informants,$t the White Court added
that "if the law gives no protection to the wrong-
doer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a
police agent, neither should it protect him when
that same agent has recorded or transmitted the
conversations. ' 's2 Finally, the Court observed that
if "one contemplating illegal activities" doubts the
trustworthiness of companions and converses none-
theless, "the risk is his.
' 'M
Much of the debate in White focused upon the
effect of bugged informants on a person's willing-
ness to engage in conversation. In terms of a "de-
fendant's" willingness to speak, the Court could see
no difference between having to risk that an asso-
ciate is a spy and having to risk that an associate
is a spy wired for sound." Stressing the average
person's willingness to speak,ss dissenting Justice
Harlan saw a major difference:
Authority is hardly required to support the propo-
sition that words would be measured a good deal
more carefully and communication inhibited if one
suspected his conversations were being transmitted
and transcribed. Were third-party buggings a prev-
alent practice, it might well smother that spontane-
ity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious,
and defiant discourse-that liberates daily life.
Much offhand exchange is easily forgotten and one
may count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected
by the very fact of a limited audience, and the
likelihood that the listener will either overlook or
forget what is said, as well as the listener's inability
to reformulate a conversation without having to
9 Id (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
302 (1966)). Hoffa was decided one year before Katz.81See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra for a
brief description of Lewis and Hoffa. See also note 110 and
accompanying text infia.
8 401 U.S. at 752.
83 Id.
5 Id.:
Given the possibility or probability that one of
-his colleagues is cooperating with the police, it is
only speculation to assert that the defendant's
utterances would be substantially different or his
sense of security any less if he also thought it
possible that the suspected colleague is wired for
sound.
8 Id. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86 The text of this article, unlike Justice Harlan's opin-
ion, limits the use of the term "third-party bugging" to
those situations in which the government eavesdrops
without the consent of any party to the conversation. See
text at notes 72-76, supra.
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contend with a documented record. All these values
are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the
need to locate a willing assistant.s7
At first glance, Justice Harlan's dissent in White
gains support from this term's cases. Tyler and
Mincey certainly support his view that the presence
of fourth amendment activity does not depend
upon hindsight determinations of the defendant's
guilt.ss Thus, the Court's focus on the "wrong-
doer's" expectations in White clearly seems to be
wrong.89 Moreover, the employer in Barlow's had
to assume the risk that employees would report
safety violations, but to the Barlow's Court this did
not imply that government had an unrestricted
right to observe for itself. It is difficult to see,
therefore, why the risk of simultaneous eavesdrop-
ping by unknown agents fell upon the defendant
in White merely because he had to assume the risk
that an associate or confidant would later report
his activities to the government.
Yet, the matter is not so simple. First, Professor
Weinreb seems to have observed correctly that
Justice Harlan's concern for protecting frivolous or
impetuous speech is not encompassed within the
fourth amendment.90 As careful as Justice Harlan
was to note the pitfalls of the Katz test, 9 he failed
to distinguish the general notion of privacy from
the more limited notion of privacy protected by
the fourth amendment. Katz, however, explicitly
recognized that the "general right to privacy-[the]
right to be let alone by other people"-is outside
the fourth amendment's domain.
92
s7 401 U.S. at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'3 See text at notes 59-70 supra.
89 Commentators had criticized this aspect of White
before Tyler and Mincey were decided. See, e.g., Dworkin,
Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits
of Lawyering, 48 INn. L.J. 329, 337 (1977); Comment, supra
note 46, at 843.
90 Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.
CHt. L. REv. 47, 68 (1974).
91 justice Harlan cautioned that the Katz test, although
an advance over the trespass doctrine, can also lead to
the "substitution of words for analysis." 401 U.S. at 786
(Harlan, J., dissenting). He added:
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as
well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges,
merely recite the expectations and risks without
examining the desirability of saddling them upon
society. The critical question, therefore, is whether
under our system of government, as reflected in the
Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the
risks of the electronic listener or observer without at
least the protection of a warrant requirement.
Id.
9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967):
The precise issue in White, then, ignored by
Justice Harlan, was the nature of the privacy in-
terest protected by the fourth amendment. The
substantive right to do certain private things with-
out government inhibition, such as to use contra-
ceptives, to have an abortion, or to make frivolous
remarks, is not rooted in the fourth amendment,93
but the secrecy or confidentiality of things done in
private is. Thus, the fourth amendment gave Katz
no right to communicate with another from a
telephone booth, but it gave him a right, once
inside the booth, to keep the government out, both
physically and informationally. Indeed, since the
government did not commit a physical trespass in
Katz, the only apparent fourth amendment interest
in that case was one of informational privacy.9
Freed from its property moorings, then, the fourth
amendment limits the government's ability to be-
[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into
a general constitutional "right to privacy." That
Amendment protects individual privacy against cer-
tain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protec-
tions go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution
protect personal privacy from other forms of gov-
ernmental invasion. But the protection of a person's
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by
other people-is, like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual States.
9 To the extent substantive privacy rights have a
constitutional basis, their source is the due process clause.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion). But cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1975) (right of
married couples to use contraceptives rooted in the pen-
umbras of several provisions in the Bill of Rights, includ-
ing the fourth amendment).
" Professor Weinreb has suggested that the fourth
amendment protects the "privacy of presence" and the
"privacy of place." The former refers to our privacy
interests against government as long as we are in a private
place; the latter refers to our privacy interests in a place
whether or not we are present. Weinreb, supra note 90, at
69. This interpretation of the fourth amendment can
explain both Katz and White. The defendant in Katz had
the privacy of presence while he was using the phone
booth, but the defendant in White, at least while in the
informant's home and in the restaurant, had the privacy
of neither presence nor place. Id. at 69 n.65.
Professor Weinreb's interpretation ties the fourth
amendment to property concepts. For example, he sees
no fourth amendment issue when an undercover agent
buys narcotics from a defendant on the street, but he sees
a violation of the privacy of place when, as in Lewis, the
same agent enters the defendant's home to complete the
purchase. Surely, however, the fourth amendment is
concerned with more than property-privacy. What Katz
and the spy cases have in common is a governmental
intrusion upon informational privacy in situations where
the individual is seeking to make only a limited disclosure.
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come cognizant of our private lives: the conditions
we live in, the things we possess, the activities we
pursue, the thoughts we sparingly share.
In White, Justice Harlan seemed concerned with
protecting a substantive right to engage in impet-
uous speech. In any event, it seems clear that he
was not concerned with informational privacy, for
he agreed with the majority that unbugged govern-
ment informants do not implicate fourth amend-
ment concerns.95 From the perspective of informa-
tional privacy, however, bugged and unbugged
informants are difficult to distinguish. Accordingly,
Justice White may have been correct in refusing to
make such a distinction.
A hypothetical may prove helpful at this point
in seeing the merit ofJustice White's all-or-nothing
approach in While. Suppose that the government
in Barlow's arranged for an undercover OSHA
inspector to be hired as an employee. Suppose
further that the employee orally reported observa-
tions to superiors, took snapshots, and occasionally
transmitted television pictures to other agents on
the outside. Would any of this activity be covered
by the fourth amendment? Under White the answer
would be no. As long as the employee-spy did not
intrude into areas forbidden to employees,96 the
employer assumed the risk. UnderJustice Harlan's
view, the television transmission-and perhaps the
taking of snapshots9 --would be considered fourth
amendment activity, but not the visual observation
and later reporting. Yet in terms of informational
privacy, each of the spy's activities divulged to the
government information it- could not otherwise
"5Justice Harlan felt that the electronic spying in
White had a greater impact on privacy than "the ordinary
type of 'informer' investigation upheld in Lewis and
Hoffa." 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan was not yet prepared to say that the fourth
amendment's umbrella should extend to the informant
with a hidden tape recorder as well as to the informant
with a hidden transmitting device. Id. at 788 ri.24. But see
note 97 infra.
' In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), a
business acquaintance, invited into the defendant's office,
searched the office in the defendant's absence. The Court
found the search, instituted at the government's behest,
unconstitutional. Distinguishing Gouled, the Court in-
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966), noted
that the agent in the latter case did not "see, hear, or
take anything that was not contemplated and in fact
intended by petitioner as a necessary part of his illegal
business."
97 While not yet prepared to say that secret recording
fell within the scope of the fourth amendment, see note
95, supra, Justice Harlan did express doubts about his
reasoning in a previous case holding that it did not. 401
U.S. at 788 n.24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
obtain, and aside from informational privacy, it is
difficult to discern what privacy interest any of the
spying invaded. Therefore, if the fourth amend-
ment addresses the hypothetical at all, it seems
illogical to exclude some of the spy's activities from
its umbrella.9
The ultimate, difficult question, then, is whether
the fourth amendment should speak at all to the
issue of participant monitoring. Unfortunately,
neither the reasoning nor the holdings in the cases
decided this term provide a definitive answer.
While Barlow's states that expectations of privacy
must be analyzed vis-4-vis the government, it no-
where provides guidelines for determining what
expectations against government are reasonable. In
fact, Barlow's fails to specify the exact interest or
expectation that an unwanted OSHA inspection
would violate. On one plausible reading, the un-
wanted entry upon private property constituted
the evil in Barlow's.9 That is, Barlow's may be read
98 Justice Harlan reasoned that the unbugged spy may
forget some of what is said, thus making it more difficult
for the government to reformulate the conversation. Id.
at 788. Contrasting the use of recording devices and
transmitters, he suggested that an informant may decide
not to play a recording, whereas a transmission, of course,
is instantaneous. Id. at 788 n.24. It is difficult to see why
these suggested distinctions have any bearing on the
question of whether the agent is engaged in a search. The
intrusion upon informational privacy is no less merely
because some details are forgotten. Moreover, a search
for physical objects would be no less intrusive if the agent
decided not to turn the spoils over to superiors. In terms
of the interests intruded upon, searches differ from sei-
zures, and the question of whether a search has occurred
cannot depend upon the agent's subsequent decision to
take or ignore the fruits of his endeavors.
99 "The critical fact in this case is that entry over Mr.
Barlow's objection is being sought by a Government
agent." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1821
(1978). The Court continued:
The owner of a business has not, by the necessary
utilization of employees in his operation, thrown
open the areas where employees alone are permitted
to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents.
That an employee is free to report, and the Govern-
ment is free to use, any evidence of noncompliance
with OSHA that the employee observes furnishes
no justification for federal agents !P enter a place of
business from which the public is restricted and to
conduct their own warrantless search.
Id. at 1822 (emphasis added). Such a "property" reading
of Barlow's is also suggested by portions of the appellee's
brief:
[A] most comprehensive variety of privacy interests
are protected from governmental intrusion by the
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. Clearly, le-
gitimate expectations of privacy, in the sense of
protected privacy interests, include those interests
related to the use and enjoyment of "private" prop-
as holding that one may invite others onto private
property without opening the door to government.
Under this limited reading, expectations of privacy
would be defined vis-A-vis government when prop-
erty interests are at stake, but in the context of
informational privacy, voluntary disclosure to oth-
ers would be tantamount to relinquishment of
fourth amendment interests. Katz cannot preclude
such a "property" reading of Barlow's, for Katz held
only that property concepts do not limit the fourth
amendment's ultimate reach, not that property
concepts are irrelevant altogether to fourth amend-
ment analysis." Indeed, the fourth amendment
must have something to do with property, because
it explicitly protects against the unreasonable sei-
zure of things. 10 1 Moreover, only a property anal-
ysis can explain Alderman v. United States,10 2 which
held, two years after Katz, that a wiretap of a
phone in a defendant's home implicates his fourth
amendment interests, even when the tap intrudes
upon the conversations of others while the defend-
ant is away.
While thus permissible, a property reading of
Barlow's would nevertheless render the fourth
amendment functionally trivial in that case and at
the same time ignore the significance of Katz.' It
seems frivolous to suggest that the employer's only
interest in Barlow's was in keeping government
agents from trespassing upon his premises. Cer-
tainly what the employer found offensive was not
mere presence, but presence for the purpose of
seeking out information. Indeed, the search war-
rant's function of defining the legitimate scope of
an OSHA inspection addresses this very concern.
While Katz does not dictate this broader reading of
Barlow's, it clearly supports it. In Katz, the unin-
vited ear intruded upon the privacy of a conver-
erty in circumstances not necessarily restricted to
solitude ... "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined
classes of cases" the privacy interests in private
property must be safeguarded against governmental
intrusion by a valid search warrant procedure.
Brief for Appellee at 28, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S.
Ct. 1816 (1978).
"'o See Amsterdam, supra note 42, at 358 & 443-44 n.83.
1o Recently some commentators have again been
stressing the importance of property concepts in fourth
amendment analysis. See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 90, at
53 & 69, emphasizing the importance of intrusions upon
the privacy of place; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz
Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154, 181
(1977), arguing that property concepts should be used as
a bottom line to define fourth amendment protections.
See also Note, supra note 36. Professor Weinreb's position
is discussed in more detail in note 94 supra.
'02 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
sation without trespassing onto property.1°3 By ap-
plying the fourth amendment to that situation, the
Court made clear that informational privacy, as
well as property-privacy, is a valid fourth amend-
ment concern.
If Barlow's thus stands for the proposition that
expectations of informational privacy must be con-
sidered vis-A-vis the government, the planted spy
becomes a ready subject of fourth amendment
interest. Nevertheless, a rejoinder may still be at-
tempted. Conceding that expectations of informa-
tional privacy must be defined against government,
it may be argued that the case still has not been
made for concluding that a presumably innocent
person has a justifiable expectation that govern-
ment will not be planting spies to see what he will
voluntarily expose. After all, the difference between
the OSHA inspection in Barlow's and the spying
activity in Lewis, Hoffa,'" White, and the above
OSHA spy hypothetical is that the defendants in
the latter either authorized entry or voluntarily
disclosed information. This counterargument, how-
ever, misses the point. Once informational privacy
is recognized as an appropriate fourth amendment
interest, and once this interest is defined vis-i-vis
government, the voluntary disclosure rationale
breaks down. By talking to a confidant, the de-
fendant in White no more consented to governmen-
tal information-gathering than did the defendant
in Barlow's, who permitted employees to observe
his premises.n° Indeed, if all else fails, the spy
hypothetical should make the point. From the view
of informational privacy interests against govern-
ment, one would have a heavy burden explaining
why the fourth amendment addresses the inspec-
tor's attempt to enter at the front door to gather
evidence and yet stands oblivious to the govern-
ment's undercover entry in the rear for the same
purpose.1
°6
103 The bugging device in Katz was outside the phone
booth used by the defendant.
"o The facts in Lewis and Hoffa are discussed briefly in
notes 73 and 76 supra, and in the accompanying text. See
also note 110 infra.
'05 Cf Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,489-90 (1964)
(consent for hotel employees to enter hotel room to
perform theirjobs is not consent for government to enter
and search for information). But see Weinreb, supra note
90, at 69, suggesting that an intrusion in the latter
instance would violate the "privacy of place." Professor
Weinreb's views are discussed in note 94 supra.
'06 Cf Amsterdam, supra note 42, at 365 ("I can con-
ceive of no rational system of concerns and values that
restricts the government's power to rifle my drawers or
tap my telephone but not its power to infiltrate my home
or my life with a legion of spies."). Amsterdam also
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An obvious tension exists, therefore, between
cases like Barlow's, and Katz on the one hand and
cases like Lewis, Hoffa, and White on the other.
Barring a reconsideration of the Katz doctrine,
which now seems basic to fourth amendment law,
it is submitted that the latter cases, with the pos-
sible exception of Lewis,'07 should be overruled.
This suggestion should not cause great consterna-
tion if it is remembered, as it too often is not, that
the issue is whether spying for information is a
search under the fourth amendment and not
whether a search warrant or full traditional prob-
able cause should be required."
The possible exception for Lewis requires expla-
nation. Situations may arise in which government
is seeking information and yet an informational
privacy interest against government is not justifia-
ble.1°9 Not every government quest for evidence or
information is, or need be, a subject of fourth
amendment interest. For example, undercover
fencing operations-popularly known as "sting"
operations-should not raise fourth amendment
concerns. What distinguishes the deception in such
an operation from the deception in Hoffa?"n The
answer must be that one, unlike the other, involves
no threat to justifiable expectations of informa-
tional privacy. The reason for this assertion is the
difficult part. As a tentative reason, the implica-
tions of which need further study, it is submitted
that such operations can only induce individuals
to acknowledge guilt or commit a crime. Merely to
ask someone to acknowledge wrongdoing (e.g., "Do
you have any radios you would like to fence?") or
to commit a crime (e.g., "I'll pay you ten dollars
for a stolen clock radio.") does not seem to impli-
suggested that the government's use of spies may be more
intrusive than its use of third-party electronic surveil-
lance. Id, at 407-09.
'7 Lewis is briefly discussed in note 76 supra. Interest-
ingly, Professor Weinreb would overrule Lewis but not
White. See note 94 supra.
108 For a discussion of these separate issues, see sections
III and IV, injfa. '
log For example, it is not a search for the government
deliberately to observe what the defendant discloses to
the general public. See note 70 supra.
""In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), a
friend of Hoffa's acted as a government spy. The friend
disclosed conversations in Hoffa's hotel suite during
Hoffa's trial on criminal charges. The Court assumed
arguendo that the friend was a planted spy rather than a
self-motivated tattletale, but this made no difference to
its analysis. For purposes of the analysis suggested in the
text, the distinction between tattletales and spies is con-
stitutionally significant, because, as Barlow's teaches, ex-
pectations of privacy are defined against government.
cate privacy at all. In any event, expectations that
government will not engage in such activity hardly
seem reasonable or justifiable and thus should not
be encompassed within the area of fourth amend-
ment concern.
This hypothesis contravenes neither the above
criticism of the "wrongdoer" approach in White
nor the rejection of that approach in Tyler and
Mincepy. It is one thing to use a hindsight approach
to withdraw fourth amendment protections be-
cause the defendant was a wrongdoer; it should be
another to deny fourth amendment protections in
advance because of the nature of the government's
activity. This is not to say that the guilty do not
deserve fourth amendment protection. The ques-
tion at issue is what kind of police conduct impli-
cates fourth amendment concerns, and once this
conduct is identified, the appropriate fourth
amendment restraints apply in cases involving the
guilty and innocent alike. In taking the first step of
defining the activity that constitutes a search it
suffices, in a free society, to ask whether the conduct
at issue could ever threaten or intrude upon infor-
mational privacy expectations unrelated to crimi-
nal conduct.' The spying in Hoffa, the inspection
in Tyler and Barlow's, and the search in Mincey all
could intrude upon innocent privacy expectations,
for not only could the individuals affected have
been innocent of wrongdoing, but the police intru-
sion, by its very nature, had to uncover more than
unlawful conduct." 2 The spy in Hoffa, for example,
.. As the preceding paragraph in the text indicates,
the proffered rationale for cases like Lewis is tentative. In
a phone conversation, Professor Kamisar of Michigan has
raised questions that cannot be ignored. For example,
suppose the government develops a sensor that detects
narcotics but nothing else. Would the use ofsuch a sensor,
at airports for example, constitute fourth amendment
activity? To the extent the text suggests that this conduct
would not be a search because it can only detect unlawful
activity, the analysis does not seem satisfactory.
In Y. KAmtsAR, J. GANO, J. HADDAM, supra note 36, at
122-25, the thesis, is proffered that cases like Lewis are
based upon the defendant's voluntary decision to disclose
his illegal activity to "anyone" interested in participating
in it. This thesis would satisfactorily account for Professor
Weinreb's concern of a "squad of government agents
posing as gas and electric company inspectors" to enter
houses. See note 114 infra. The difficulty, however, is that
defendants in cases like Lewis are not willing to make
disclosures to the general public but only to those seg-
ments of the public willing to engage in the illegal
enterprise. The same, of course, could be said for the
defendant in White. If cases like White and Lewis are to
be distinguished, therefore, as this article suggests they
should, the rationale set forth in the cited book also seems
incomplete.
n"The hypothesis suggested in the text provides a
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necessarily intruded upon both lawful and unlaw-
ful conversations, 
3
The proffered hypothesis, then, is that the fourth
amendment's concern for the security of persons is
exceeded when justifiable expectations of privacy
include expectations that relate to nothing more
than a propensity for wrongful conduct. A "sting"
operation can only uncover a person's propensity
to commit crime. Similarly, it would seem that the
police conduct in Lewis, unlike that in Hoffa, did
not constitute a threat to any justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy. Barring persistent entreaties that
smack of entrapment, a simple request for an in-
rationale for the statement by Professor Kitch that a
burglar cannot complain about governmental monitoring
of the burglarized house without the owner's consent.
Kitch, supra note 46, at 136. With respect to the burglar,
such monitoring, like a "sting" operation, could not
intrude upon any privacy expectations concerning lawful
activity. But see note 11l supra.
Professor Kitch's hypothetical, however, really raises
a question of standing, not one of fourth amendment
activity. Secret monitoring poses a threat to legitimate
informational privacy interests and thus is a search, but
without either a property interest or ajustifiable privacy
interest, the burglar lacks standing to raise the issue. See
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
113 Similarly, it would be a search for an undercover
agent to give a defendant a television with a hidden radio
transmitter in exchange for a delivery of narcotics. Al-
though the transmitter would be imposed on an obviously
guilty person, it, like the spy in Hoffa, would intrude upon
conversations of both the defendant and third parties
having nothing to do with wrongdoing. It bears emphasis
that the hypothesis in the text does not deny justifiable
expectations of privacy to guilty people; rather, the hy-
pothesis suggests that expectations of privacy that relate
only to wrongful conduct are not justifiable. Most gov-
ernmental quests for information necessarily pose a threat
to both justifiable and unjustifiable expectations of pri-
vacy. Such quests, therefore, would be considered
searches under the hypothesis in the text.
Changing the facts somewhat, it should likewise be a
search if the agent attached a hidden "beeper"-a track-
ing device that emits an electronic signal but does not
transmit conversation-to the television. Again, it cannot
matter that the defendant must be guilty. The informa-
tion disclosed by a beeper encompasses more than crim-
inal conduct. But see United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1976). Of course, it is another thing altogether
to suggest that individuals, whether guilty or innocent,
cannot have privacy expectations in their comings and
goings because such matters are necessarily observable by
the general public. As previously discussed, however, the
fourth amendment requirements should apply unless the
government uses the same means as the general public to
observe the defendant. See note 70 supra. See aLso United
States v. Itolmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975). aFfd by an
equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (1976) (en bane).
dividual to sell narcotics can only ascertain whether
that individual is willing to do so. The request in
Lewis, unlike the spying in Hoffa, posed no threat
to justifiable expectations of informational pri-
vacy.1
4
It may be hard to draw a line between spying
activities that necessarily intrude broadly and in-
discriminately upon informational privacy on the
one hand and undercover activities or decoy oper-
ations that only give an individual an opportunity
to acknowledge or commit wrongdoing on the
other. Yet not to attempt to draw it, or to draw
some other satisfactory line,1 5 results in either too
little fourth amendment protection, as in White, or
too much. 6
2. Third-Party Subpoenas Reconsidered
This term's search and seizure cases also require
reconsideration of the issue of third-party sub-
poenas-subpoenas addressed to third parties that
seek information about another individual. Ad-
dressing this issue two years ago, the Supreme
114 In arguing that Lewis should be overruled, Professor
Weinreb posits the hypothetical of a squad of government
agents posing as gas and electric company inspectors.
Weinreb, supra note 90, at 67. The Weinreb hypothetical,
however, is clearly distinguishable from Lewis. The agent
in Lewis only provided an opportunity for the defendant
to commit a crime; the agents in Professor Weinreb's
hypothetical would obviously intrude upon thejustifiable
privacy expectations of innocent and guilty people alike.
For another explanation, see note 111 supra.
itS Cf Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping
and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of
a Participant in Conversation, 68 CoLuM. L. REv. 189, 224
(1968) (suggesting that the planting of friends as spies
may be different than the planting of strangers). Professor
Weinreb's hypothetical, note 114 supra, and the OSIIA
spy hypothetical described in the text, notes 96-98 supra,
have convinced this author that such a distinction, with-
out more, is untenable. For another proposal concerning
the appropriate place to draw the line, see note I supra.
116 But see Amsterdam, supra note 42, at 403:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment.
It is whether, if the particular form of surveillance
practiced by the police is permitted to go unregu-
lated by constitutional restraints, the amount of
privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims
of a free society. That, in outright terms, is the
judgment lurking underneath the Supreme Court's
decision in Katz, and it seems to me the judgment
that the fourth amendment inexorably requires the
Court to make.
The argument in the text is that "sting" operations and
police activity like that employed in Lewis, unlike the
police activity in Hoffa and in Professor Weinreb's hypo-
thetical, see note 114 supra, do not pose a threat to the
privacy and freedom that make our society free.
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Court in United States v. Miller,"7 in an opinion
authored by Justice Powell, held that a depositor
has "no protectable fourth amendment interest""
' 8
in bank records-deposit slips, cancelled checks,
and financial statements-subpoenaed by the gov-
ernment. Under provisions of the Bank Secrecy
Act," 9 banks were required to maintain such rec-
ords.10
The Miller Court first noted that depositors have
no property interest in bank records,2' a conclusion
that itself may not be altogether correct."° More
significantly, however, the Court concluded that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
"1 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Iad at 437. In its brief, the government framed the
issue in terms of standing, contending that the fourth
amendment protects only one against whom a search is
directed, not one who merely claims prejudice through
the use of gathered evidence. Petitioner's Brief at 1 1-12,
18, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The
Court, however, did not make clear whether the subpoena
duces tecum at issue was not a search or whether the
respondent simply lacked standing to challenge the le-
gality of such a search. By citing Lewis, Hoffia, Katz and
White, the opinion suggests that the subpoena did not
implicate fourth amendment interests. 425 U.S. at
440-43. On the other hand, the Court also cited Okla-
homa Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946),
which suggested that a subpoena duces tecum is subject
to at least minimum fourth amendment "reasonableness"
requirements. Similarly, in California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Court considered the
merits of a fourth amendment challenge by banks to
statutory requirements that they report financial trans-
actions of their depositors. This suggests, then, that a
subpoena for bank records is a search for fourth amend-
ment purposes, but one that only the bank has standing
to challenge. See also text at notes 137-41 infra.
It is easy to confuse the questions of fourth amendment
activity and standing, because one of the standing
grounds is identical with the Katz test for determining
whether a search has occurred. See Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364 (1968). Nonetheless, the distinction is im-
portant. As illustrated above, for example, if a subpoena
duces tecum is not a search, even the banks would be
precluded from making a fourth amendment challenge.
However Miller is read, the contention in this section
of the article is that it was wrongly decided.
"9 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (b), (d) (1970).
1n The Court upheld the recordkeeping requirements
over fourth amendment challenges by both banks and
depositors in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 1974).S425 U.S. at 440.
1ss See Comment, Government Access to Bank Records in the
Aflermath of United States v. Miller and the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 14 Hous. L. REv. 636, 644 n.58 (1977). See also
Petitioner's Brief at 21 n.13, United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976), conceding that cancelled checks belong
to the drawer but arguing that this has no bearing when
a microfilm copy of such a check is subpoenaed.
the "contents" of such records. The Court observed
that checks "are not confidential communications
but negotiable instruments to be used in commer-
cial transactions."' 1 23 Moreover, all the subpoenaed
documents contained "only information voluntar-
ily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.'
124
Citing White, the Court added that "the depositor
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,
that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the government.""ss This is true, the
Court continued, "even if the information is re-
vealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose."' 126 Finding no fourth
amendment interests implicated, the Court applied
"the general rule that the issuance of a subpoena
to a third party to obtain the records of that party
does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if
a criminal prosecution is contemplated at that
time."
127
This term's cases are not needed to challenge the
Miller Court's first Katz argument that checks are
not confidential communications but only com-
mercial instruments: As Justice Powell himself rec-
ognized just two years before Miller, "financial
transactions can reveal much about a person's
activities, associations, and beliefs. ' a And, as
Powell had further noted, governmental inquiry
into such areas clearly seems to implicate "legiti-
mate expectations of privacy."' 9 This conclusion,
nevertheless, is not sufficient to undermine the
Miller holding, for the role of the bank as a party
to the financial transaction may have fourth
amendment significance.
The Miller Court viewed the bank's role as sim-
ilar to that of the informant or undercover agent
in the participant monitoring cases. This view may
be challenged even if the conclusions reached in
the previous section are put aside and Hoffa and
White are thus assumed to be correctly decided.
'23 425 U.S. at 442.
12A id. "
"25 Id. at 443.
12 Id.
27Id. at 444. This application of the "general rule"
seems redundant because the Court had basically said
the same thing by concluding that the defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of the records.
"a California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,
78-79 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). For an
excellent description of the dangers, see Comment, supra
note 122.
in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79
(Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
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Even if we further assume that banking transac-
tions are "voluntary" in today's economically so-
phisticated world,"3 ° the obligation of a bank that
receives "volunteered" information seems clearly
distinguishable, at least from a legal perspective,
from the obligation of a friend or associate who
receives confidences. A bank, unlike an associate,
can be sued for unauthorized disclosure,13 ' a fact
that the Miller Court failed to address and that the
government fudged in its brief.'3 2 Something more
than a disappointed expectation would be justified
if a bank teller broadcast the details of a depositor's
just-completed transaction to the other customers
at the bank.
This term's cases, of course, make the argument
against Miller much stronger. Barlow's, as previ-
ously discussed, held that the voluntary disclosure
of information to select individuals does not nec-
essarily undermine reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy against government. Just as the employer in
Barlow's could have reasonable expectations that
government would not intrude upon his premises
even though he opened them to employees and
other business contractors, it would seem that the
defendant in Miller could legitimately expect that
his limited disclosures to business associates and
bank employees would not result in carte blanche
" In its brief, the government maintained that it is no
more necessary to use bank checks and to have bank
accounts than it is to engage in employment, sales, or
business transactions. Petitioner's Brief at 26, United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The analogy should
itself defeat the argument. See also Comment, supra note
122, at 639 n.22, claiming that there are over 200 million
bank accounts in the country.
131 See Comment, supra note 122, at 644 n.66; Note, IRS
Access to Bank Records; Proposed Modifications in Administrative
Subpoena Procedure, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 247, 261 n.72 (1976).
32 The government conceded in a footnote that some
courts have found an obligation of confidentiality under
both contract and tort law, but it maintained that this
obligation did not extend to disclosures to government.
It added that such disclosures were mandated by the
bank's public duty to cooperate with government. Peti-
tioner's Brief at 27 n. 17, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976). This, of course, begged the question, for if a
duty of confidentiality exists, a plausible argument can
be made that the duty should yield only when the
governmental request is in the form of valid legal process.
The Court found it unnecessary to address the question
of what constitutes valid legal process in view of its
conclusion that'a depositor takes the risk by disclosing
financial transactions to a bank. 425 U.S. at 439-40.
Perhaps the Court cannot be faulted for passing over
the confidentiality issue. Like the government's 54 page
brief, respondent's 16 page brief relegated the issue to a
footnote. Respondent's Brief at 6 n.1, United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
access to these dealings by government. Of course,
Justice Powell in Miller denied that the Court had
authorized unnecessarily wide-ranging inquiries,
13 3
but if such a limitation truly exists it seems more
relevant to the question of whether a search is
reasonable than to the initial question of whether
a search has occurred. Indeed, Powell's caveat
seems to concede that legitimate privacy expecta-
tions are not relinquished by disclosure to the bank.
Despite these criticisms, Miller remains a difficult
case, for a difference can be perceived, even if only
in moral tone, between government issuing a sub-
poena for third-party testimony and government
planting a spy.'3 4 More broadly, a fourth amend-
ment difference seems to exist between a subpoena
for evidence, no matter to whom addressed, and
overt conduct, such as forceful rummaging through
possessions, usually identified as a search.353 Justice
McKenna stated it well in his separate opinion in
Hale v. Henkel:
136
It is said "a search implies a quest by an officer of
the law; a seizure contemplates a forcible dispos-
session of the owner." Nothing can be more direct
and plain; nothing more expressive to distinguish a
subpoena from a search warrant .... The distinction
is based upon what is authorized or directed to be
done .... "The quest of an officer" acts upon the
things themselves-may be secret, intrusive, accom-
panied by force. The service of a subpoena is but
the delivery of a paper to a party-is open and
aboveboard. There is no element of trespass or force
in it. It does not disturb the possession of property.
It cannot be finally enforced except after challenge,
and ajudgment of the court upon the challenge....
Of course, it constrains the will of parties, subjects
their property to the uses of proof. But we are surely
not prepared to say that such uses are unreasonable
or are sacrifices which the law may not demand.
Of course, the last quoted sentence can be inter-
preted as suggesting that a subpoena for evidence
is a "reasonable" search under the fourth amend-
ment, but the thrust of Justice McKenna's argu-
ment was clearly that subpoenas and searches are
different things. Nevertheless, despite some ambig-
uous passages in its opinion,su this view did not
33 425 U.S. at 444 n.6.
134 Of course, the bank's role is more analogous to that
of a planted spy when the government requires it to keep
the records in the first place, but the Court, citing Lewis,
found this irrelevant. 425 U.S. at 443.
1ss See McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private
Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND.
L.J. 55, 89-90 (1977).
'13 201 U.S. 43, 80-81 (1905).
37 The Court criticized the reasoning in Boyd v.
[Vol. 69
PERPLEXING QUESTIONS ABOUT FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
prevail with a majority of the Court. Indeed, Hale
specifically held that the grand jury subpoena
duces tecum at issue was far too sweeping to be
"reasonable" under the fourth amendment.s To
this extent, Hale remained true to the teaching of
Boydv. United Statesso9 that the evil addressed by the
fourth amendment includes "the compulsory pro-
duction of private papers, whether under a search
warrant or a subpoena duces tecu."' ° And al-
though the Court has never applied traditional
probable cause requirements to such subpoenas, it
has continued to assert that their reasonableness
must be addressed under the fourth amendment.141
In its Miller brief, however, the government ar-
gued that a subpoena to the bank for records of
Miller's transactions could not be distinguished
from a subpoena seeking the testimony of one of
Miller's friends.1'4 The implication, of course, was
that if Miller had a fourth amendment interest in
the former, he would have a similar interest in the
latter. Undoubtedly intended as reductio adabsurdum,
the argument, at least at first glance, seems ex-
tremely powerful. In terms of fourth amendment
implications, a difference surely seems to exist be-
tween a subpoena directed to a party for his records
or testimony, as in Boyd and Hale, and a subpoena
for a third person's testimony concerning activities
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which first held that
a subpoena for private papers raises fourth amendment
questions. 201 U.S. at 71-73. The Court also said that it
was "quite clear that the search and seizure clause of the
4th Amendment was not intended to interfere with the
power of courts to compel, through a subpoena duces
tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, ofdocumen-
tary evidence." Id at 73. Of course, subpoenas issued
during the course of a trial raise different questions than
subpoenas issued during the investigatory process.
M 201 U.S. at 76.
'39 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'40 201 U.S. at 76. The full quote reads:
We are also of opinion that an order for the pro-
duction of books and papers may constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth
Amendment. While a search ordinarily implies a
quest by an officer of the law, and a seizure contem-
plates a forcible dispossession of the owner, still, as
was held in the Boyd case, the substance of the offense
is the compulsory production of private papers,
whether under a search warant or a subpoena duces
tecum.
141 See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Pub. Co.. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 207-08 (1945). See also, United States v. Dion-
isio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973). Dionisio also held, however,
that a subpoena to appear and testify does not constitute
a seizure for fourth amendment purposes. Dioniso is
discussed further in note 154 infra.
142 Petitioner's Brief at 12, United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976).
or conversations of the first party. To say otherwise
is to depart radically from the common assumption
and to risk one's analytic credibility."' Neverthe-
less, with the reminder that a finding of fourth
amendment activity says nothing about either the
need for a warrant or the need for traditional
probable cause, it is submitted that this term's
cases, Barlow's in particular, lend support to what
in any event would be a strong argument that
third-party subpoenas for testimony may some-
times implicate fourth amendment in-
terests.'"
Although the thesis is radical, a couple of hypo-
theticals may help make at least a presumptive
case for the argument. First, suppose that govern-
ment officials have a reasonable suspicion that X,
in violation of the law, is regularly mailing obscene
literature or gambling information to Y. Seeking
to learn about the content of these mailings, the
officials contemplate the following courses of ac-
tion:
1. An interception of the mail in route, with the
purpose of opening it and reading its contents.
2. A subpoena duces tecum to be served on X just
before he drops the suspected mailing in the mail-
box.
14 5
3. A subpoena served on X, either before or after
the mailing, seeking his oral testimony about the
contents.
4. A subpoena duces tecum to be served on Y just
after he receives the suspected mailing.
5. A subpoena served on Y, just after he receives
the mailing, seeking his oral testimony about the
contents.
"'a As Justice Douglas once stated, "it is difficult to see
how the summoning of a third party, and the records of
a third party, can violate the rights of the taxpayer, even
if a criminal prosecution is contemplated or in progress."
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 537 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
"'A third-party subpoena only implicates fourth
amendment interests when the third-party is asked to
reveal confidences. That is, as Katz teaches, reasonable
expectations of privacy must be implicated. See. Note,
supra note 36, at 988-89. For example, it should be
obvious that a subpoena to a bank robbery witness does
not implicate any fourth amendment interests of the
robber. Concededly, however, it may sometimes be diffi-
cult to distinguish that which is private and protected
from that which is not. See McKenna, supra note 135, at
55 n.I.
"4 This is not too far. fetched from the standpoint of
factual possibility. In Katz, the agents were able to learn
that the defendant would be using a certain phone booth
for several minutes at the same time each morning. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 n.14 (1967).
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For a second and similar hypothetical, reconsider
the facts in Katz.14 6 There, presumably with full
probable cause that the defendant was using a
certain phone booth to transmit wagering infor-
mation, the government placed an electronic listen-
ing device outside the booth. This activity may be
analogized to the actual interception of the letter
in the first hypothetical. As alternative courses of
action, the government could have contemplated
subpoenas like those in the third or fifth options
described in the letter hypothetical. The question,
of course, is whether from the standpoint of impli-
cating fourth amendment interests-not from the
standpoint of ultimate reasonableness require-
ments-the options in these hypotheticals can be
distinguished.
Although it has been over a century since the
Supreme Court recognized that opening the mail
constitutes fourth amendment activity, 47 it has
only been slightly over a decade since the Court
applied the fourth amendment to non-trespassory
wiretapping.148 The distinction between the two
procedures was perhaps viable as long as property
concepts dominated fourth amendment analysis.
However, a property-privacy dichotomy cannot
really explain the difference, for surely opening
and reading a letter was always considered more
intrusive than a temporary seizure. 149 The reason,
suggested by Katz, is that reading the contents of
a letter intrudes upon informational privacy, a
central concern of the fourth amendment.15°
From the perspective of informational privacy,
it would be formalistic to maintain that the fourth
amendment is implicated by mail reading and
wiretapping but not by governmental attempts to
obtain the same information by subpoenas ad-
dressed to the party sending the message. Hence,
the second and third option in the letter hypothet-
ical and the second option in the Katz hypothetical
would, like traditional searches, implicate fourth
amendment interests. 51 Indeed, as already noted,
the Supreme Court recognized in Boyd and Hale,
and apparently continues to recognize, that the
' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
147 In re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
"4s Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (trespassory
electronic surveillance).
149 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
See also In re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (distin-
guishing sealed and open packages and talking about the
"secrecy" of letters).
"" See section II B 1 supra.
151 See McKenna, supra note 135, at 85-87.
party receiving a subpoena may have fourth
amendment interests to assert.S 2 Katz, of course,
reinforces this position, for once informational pri-
vacy is recognized as the relevant fourth amend-
ment concern, the absence of trespass or force-so
crucial to Justice McKenna in Hale'3-must be
irrelevant.' 5
This leaves for consideration the third-party sub-
poenas. First, it should be apparent that the fourth
amendment issue cannot turn on any distinction
between a subpoena for testimony and one for
documents. In the mail hypothetical, for example,
X's informational privacy interests-whatever they
may be-are surely implicated to the same degree
whether the subpoena be for Y's testimony or for
Y to bring the letter." Moreover, to distinguish
the subpoena for the letter in the first hypothetical
from the subpoena for the testimony of Katz'
telephone partner in the second hypothetical would
be to resurrect the distinction between tangible
and intangible effects, a distinction Katz put to
final rest.
It requires no belabored discussion at this point
'52 See text at notes 137-41, supra. Boyd found the fourth
amendment implicated by "any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers."
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (empha-
sis added).
'5 See text at note 136 supra.
" Until recently, the fifth amendment protection
against compulsory self-incrimination overshadowed the
fourth amendment concern in first party subpoenas. In
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), however,
the Court suggested, without holding, that the fifth
amendment may not protect against disclosure of previ-
ously written documents. Because of the doubts raised by
Fisher, and because of the increasing use of testimonial
immunity, the fourth amendment privacy concern now
looms much larger.
In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the
Court, reasoning that every person has an obligation to
appear and give evidence before a grand jury, held that
a grand jury subpoena does not "seize" a person for
fourth amendment purposes. Dionisio, however, does not
suggest that a subpoenaed person lacks any fourth
amendment interest in the subject matter of his testi-
mony. Rather, the Court carefully noted that the grand
jury request for a voice sample from the subpoenaed
person involved "none of the probing into an individual's
private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search." Id. at 15 (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 727 (1969)).
The statement in the text that the absence of trespass
or force is irrelevant should not be taken out of context.
Again, it must be emphasized that the issue under dis-
cussion is whether a subpoena constitutes a search, not
the reasonableness requirements that subpoenas have to
meet to constitute searches.
1" Note, supra note 36, at 989-90.
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to reach the conclusion that the third-party sub-
poenas in both hypotheticals implicate fourth
amendment interests.156 In the first hypothetical, it
cannot matter that X's letter is now in Y's hands,
for the relevant concern is informational privacy,
not property-privacy. Nor can it be argued that X,
or Katz in the second hypothetical, relinquished
expectations of informational privacy by disclosing
thoughts to another, for Barlow's makes clear that
a limited disclosure to third parties does not negate
privacy expectations against government. Barlow's
should reassure us that government does not obtain
a right of carte blanche access to our thoughts when-
ever we decide to write letters or make phone calls.
Of course, the fourth amendment, which ad-
dresses governmental activity, does not protect us
against the risk that a confidant will become a
tattletale and willingly testify against us.157 More-
over, there still may be a constitutional difference
16As previously indicated, the Miller Court made
reference to a general rule that "the issuance of a sub-
poena to a third party to obtain the records of that party
does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if a
criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time the
subpoena is issued." See text at note 127, supra. Never-
theless, the Court did this only after first analyzing the
fourth amendment interests of the depositor. To the
extent the Court incorrectly analyzed those interests, the
cited rule cannot preclude application of the fourth
amendment. In any event, the so-called general rule crept
into the cases without supporting analysis. The oldest
Supreme Court case supporting the rule is a per curiam
affirmance of a lower court opinion. See First Nat'l Bank
of Mobile v. United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925) (per
curiam) affig 295 F.2d 142 (S.D. Ala. 1924). The lower
court opinion, however, rejected a subpoenaed bank's
attempt to assert the rights of its customers. It does not
appear from the opinion that the customers tried to assert
their own fourth amendment rights. See also Justice v.
United States, 390 U.S. 199 (1968) (per curiam) af/'g
United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Pikesville, 274 F.
Supp. 283 (E.D. Ky. 1967). The taxpayer intervened in
this case, but the lower court rejected the constitutional
challenge simply by noting that the record failed to
support the assertion that the IRS wanted the bank
records for purposes of a criminal investigation. The
lower court's opinion was decided six months before Katz,
and the appellant's brief to the Supreme Court did not
cite that case. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517, 522 (1971), the taxpayer conceded that a subpoena
to his employer did not present a constitutional issue,
and the Court, .merely citing the above cases, added
gratuitously that the question "appears to have been
settled long ago." Finally, in United States v. LaSalle
Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357, 2362 n.8 (1978), the Court
referred to its conclusion in Donaldson "that the summon-
ing of the employer's and the accountant's records for an
investigation of the taxpayer did not violate the consti-
tutional rights of any of them."
157 See Note, supra note 36, at 989-90.
between the government planting a spy, as in Hoffa,
and the government issuing a third-party sub-
poena. Unlike governmental spying, which uses
deception to intrude upon privacy interests, a sub-
poena may be viewed simply as a request for
information. 158 To the extent this is true, the third
party's decision not to challenge the subpoena may
make the situation analogous to that of the tattle-
tale.159 At the very least, the doctrine of third-party
consent should preclude the first party from being
able to assert fourth amendment reasonableness
requirements.1
60
This latter reasoning, however, should not be
available in cases like Miller. Just as a hotel clerk
cannot give legal consent to a search of a rented
hotel room,16 1 the bank's legal obligation of confi-
dentiality 62 should preclude it from having a right
to consent. The bank, then, should have an obli-
gation either to challenge the subpoena in a hear-
ing at which the customer can appear or, at a
minimum, to notify the customer of the option of
consenting to or fighting the subpoena.
The only possible remaining argument on behalf
of Miller is that the Bank Secrecy Act, by mandat-
ing the recording and disclosure of bank records,
has negated reasonable expectations of informa-
tional privacy. This, as earlier noted, involves an
ambiguous part of the Barlow's holding. 63 Never-
theless, by requiring either a long history of past
"
1 See Petitioner's Brief at 49, United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976), arguing that a subpoena is not self-
executing even if it says that the person is "commanded"
to testify or to produce documents.
159 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
makes it unnecessary for the government to advise the
third party of the right to refuse consent. On the other
hand, the use of words like "command" in the subpoena
might create a problem. Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968) (claim of authority by police vitiates
consent). But see Petitioner's Brief at 49, United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
16 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
See also White, The Fourth Amendment As a Way of Talking
About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT.
REv. 165, 216-32 (P. Kurland ed.).
161 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). Whether
the phone company should be permitted to consent to
the government's request by subpoena for a customer's
long distance phone records may be a more difficult
question. See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 23
CRIM. L. REP. 2558 (BNA) (D.C. Cir. 1978) simply
reasoning along lines rejected in this article that the
customer lost his fourth amendment protections by trans-
acting business with third parties.
16 2 See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
163 See text at notes 52-58 supra.
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regulation, or perhaps a short history of pervasive
regulation, Barlow's rejected the view that govern-
ment can simply define its conduct outside the
fourth amendment's umbrella. Barlow's should thus
make apparent that the fourth amendment impli-
cations of subpoenas cannot be avoided merely by
statutory decree.
In summary, Miller, like Hoffa and White, cannot
survive an analysis predicated on Katz and this
term's search and seizure principles. Indeed, the
fourth amendment implications of Barlow's and
Katz extend well beyond the subpoena for bank
records at issue in Miller. It remains, however, to
ascertain what this term's cases have to say about
the reasonableness of such searches.
III
THE REQUISITE STANDARD OF CAUSE
A. THE BALANCING TEST: REQUIRING LESS THAN TRA-
DITIONAL PROBABLE CAUSE
1. Probable Cause Based Upon Administrative Guidelines
Although Barlow's required search warrants to
justify unwanted entries by OSHA inspectors, it
did not require probable cause in the traditional
sense of that term. Quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court,'6 Barlow's held that it would suffice to show
that "reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards for conducting an... inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular [establishment]. ' ' 165
Camara, as is now widely known, held that the
meaning of probable cause may vary from one
context to another as a function of reasonableness.
And in a frequently quoted sentence, Camara added
that "there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search
entails." 16 While this doctrinal development was
extremely important, especially for the soon to be
decided stop and frisk cases, 16 7 the notion of prob-
able cause as a flexible concept originated long
before Camara. For example, in Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling,1 0 -a case given just a passing cita-
'f 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
165 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1824
(1978) (quoting 387 U.S. at 538).
'6 387 U.S. at 536-37.
17See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For an
excellent discussion of the balancing principle in the stop
and frisk cases, see LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 40 (1968).
'r 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
tion in Camara' 0 -the Court recognized that prob-
able cause does not have its traditional meaning in
the context of evidentiary subpoenas.
1 70
The Camara dissenters criticized the Court for
prostituting the fourth amendment's command
that no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause.1 71 In both Barlow's and Tyler, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun, ex-
pressed the same view. Maintaining that the fra-
mers directed the fourth amendment at the evil of
the general warrant, Justice Stevens argued that
the requirement of traditional probable cause pro-
tects against this evil. The warrant clause should
not apply, he stated, when traditional notions of
probable cause are inappropriate.'7 2
The functional significance of Justice Stevens'
'69 Toward the end of its discussion of probable cause,
the Camara Court reiterated that "ifa valid public interest
justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is proba-
ble cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant."
The Court then made a ef citation to Oklahoma Press. In
See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967), a companion
case to Camara, the Court cited Oklahoma Press for the
proposition that a subpoena for corporate records consti-
tutes a "constructive" search.
170 327 U.S. at 209:
The requirement of probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, literally applicable in the
case of a warrant, is satisfied in that of an order
for production by the court's determination that
the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for
a purpose Congress can order, and the documents
sought are relevant to the inquiry.
171 The fourth amendment has two clauses. The first
protects the right of the people to be secure against
"unreasonable searches and seizures;" the second states
that no warrants shall issue "but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or
thins to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
,FAccording to Justice Stevens:
The requirement that a warrant only issue on a
showing of particularized probable cause was the
means adopted to circumscribe the warrant power.
While the subsequent course of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in this Court emphasizes the dangers
posed by warrantless searches conducted without
probable cause, it is the general reasonableness stan-
dard in the first clause, not the Warrant clause, that
the Framers adopted to limit this category of
searches.... [W]e should not dilute the require-
ments of the Warrant Clause in an effort to force
every kind of governmental intrusion which satisfies
the Fourth Amendment definition of a "search"
into a judicially developed, warrant-preference
scheme.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1828 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S.
Ct. 1942, 1952 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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position is difficult to appreciate. Both he and the
majority agreed in Barlow's and Tyler that a bal-
ancing analysis was appropriate; they disagreed,
however, over the issue to be resolved by balancing.
To the majority, balancing gave meaning to prob-
able cause, but to Justice Stevens, balancing deter-
mined whether a warrant should be required.' Of
course, by balancing away the need for a warrant
in OSHA cases, Justice Stevens, like the majority,
also rejected the need for traditional probable
cause; warrantless searches are governed, he ar-
gued, by the reasonableness clause of the fourth
amendment. 174 Both the majority and dissenting
positions, therefore, recognized a doctrinal basis for
avoiding traditional probable cause requirements.
To the extent, however, that the need for a
warrant in certain classes of cases is firmly estab-
lished,'76 Justice Stevens' approach may leave less
room for tampering with traditional probable
cause requirements and thus provide some assur-
ance that fourth amendment law will not ulti-
mately degenerate into one large, subjective test of
reasonableness.78 On the other hand, the Court's
automobile cases suggest that the need for tradi-
tional probable cause may sometimes be more
firmly grounded than is the warrant require-
ment.17 If this is true, then Justice Stevens' ap-
proach constitutes the greater threat to established
173 In Barlow's, Justice Stevens said, "In determining
whether a warrant is a necessary safeguard in a given
class of cases, 'the Court has weighed the public interest
against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individ-
ual..... "' 98 S. Ct. at 1829 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. 543,
555 (1976)). The quote from Martiner-Fuerte does not
support Justice Stevens' position, for the Court in that
section of its opinion was concerned with the requisite
standard of cause for stops at fixed checkpoints near the
border, not with the need for a warrant.
'74 98 S. Ct. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In ac-
tuality, the Court has usually required full probable cause
for warrantless searches whenever full probable cause
would be required for similar searches conducted pur-
suant to a warrant. Otherwise, the incentive for obtaining
warrants would be weakened. See LaFave, supra note 167,
at 53-54.
"sJustice Stevens said that the Court has "generally"
required a warrant "in cases involving the investigation
of criminal activity." 98 S. Ct. at 1827 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
7
' For a discussion of this danger, see Amsterdam,
supra note 42, at 393-94.
r 7See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
See also, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1822
n.10 (1978) (observing that the requirement of probable
cause has not been abandoned in the automobile cases).
fourth amendment safeguards, for it provides a
ready analysis for those inclined to dispense even
further with the warrant requirement. 78 The re-
sult, of course, could be an increasingly large class
of cases in which neither pre-search judicial scru-
tiny nor traditional probable cause would apply.
7 9
Unlike Camara, neither Barlow's nor Tyler at-
tempted to justify the lesser standard of probable
cause in the context of OSHA inspections and fire
investigations. Camara, however, did not hold that
all administrative inspections, whatever their na-
ture, are reasonable on less than traditional prob-
able cause; rather, that decision attempted to bal-
ance the public need against the degree of intrusion
in the particular context of municipal code inspec-
tions.18w The Camara Court noted that such inspec-
tions "have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance", are necessary to detect dangerous con-
ditions such as faulty wiring, and are neither per-
sonal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of
criminal evidence.' 8' While some of this reasoning
has been soundly criticized, most notably by Pro-
fessor LaFave,182 it seems fair to say that the Court
ultimately reached the correct conclusion on the
probable cause issue.
183
Whether the Court reached the correct conclu-
sion in Barlow's is difficult to say in the absence of
any analysis to review. The Court's lack of analysis
with regard to probable cause is particularly un-
fortunate since the company in Barlow's specifically
argued that the OSHA inspection mandate is "so
broad ... that the Camara examples of passage of
time and area characteristic tests for probable cause
17 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976) (permitting warrantless inventory searches of au-
tomobiles lawfully in police custody); United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (permitting warrantless
seizure and search of trousers taken from person in police
custody). See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I,
17-24 (1977) (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting)
(arguing that warrantless search of footlocker in police
custody should be upheld).
'7 Whether right or wrong, the balancing analysis of
Justice Stevens' opinion may help explain the automobile
cases. See section IV B infra.
'8' In See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), a companion
case to Camara, the Court imposed a warrant requirement
on fire code inspections of commercial premises. Without
balancing the interests, the Court summarily concluded
that probable cause would be measured by a "flexible
standard of reasonableness." Id at 545.
'a' 387 U.S. at 537.
'
8 2 See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. Rv.
1, 13-20 (P. Kurland ed.).
'83 See id. at 20.
would not necessarily apply."'"8 Even a quick con-
sideration of the factors found relevant in Camara
suggests that the company's position may have had
merit. First, as the Court itself conceded, "the
degree of federal involvement in employee working
circumstances has never been of the order of spec-
ificity and pervasiveness that OSHA mandates.
' 1
sa
Hence, it cannot be said that OSHA inspections
"have a long history ofjudicial and public accept-
ance." Indeed, such inspections have provoked
quite a bit of hostility, at least from some segments
of the public.' 86 Second, the need for OSHA in-
spections on less than traditional probable cause
may be open to question. Certainly employees,
who have a direct stake in health and safety, are
free to report observable hazards to the govern-
merit, 8 7 a fact that perhaps distinguishes the hous-
ing inspections in Camara.'88 Of course, the effec-
tiveness of employee reporting depends to some
extent on the scope of the inspector's authority. To
the extent that the inspector has a broad right of
access, the more limited observations of employees
may not be deemed a satisfactory substitute.
In terms of the third Camara factor-the intru-
siveness of the inspection-the scope of the inspec-
tor's authority may itself be a problem. Even
assuming that OSHA inspections are not aimed at
184 Brief for Appellee at 54-55, Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978). After concluding that prob-
able cause could be based upon reasonable administrative
standards, Camara indicated that such standards may be
based upon the passage of time since a previous inspec-
tion, the nature of the building, or the condition of the
entire area. 387 U.S. at 538.
i&
5 98 S. Ct. at 1821.
188 Some of this hostility was evident in the briefs filed
against the government. Several, for example, referred to
the burden on employers in trying to comply with over
4,000 regulations. E.g., Brief for Appellee at 39; Brief for
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Amer-
ica, Amicus Curiae at 17, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 98 S.
Ct. 1816 (1978). The brief by the Chamber of Commerce
also described many of the OSHA regulations as vague.
Id. See also Brief for Amicus Curiae for Pacific Legal
Foundation at 18, referring to the "nit-picking ... for
which OSHA has become notorious." For an expression
ofjudicial uneasiness over the scope of OSHA's authority,
see Brennan v. Gibson's Prod., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154
(E.D. Tex. 1976). Drivers of automobiles may also have
observed bumper stickers urging the repeal of OSHA.
i87 See Brief for Amicus Curiae for Pacific Legal Foun-
dation at 17-18, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct.
1816 (1978) (urging that probable cause be based upon
employee complaints).
'
88 See LaFave, supra note 182 at 16, pointing out that
reliance on citizen complaints would not assure "a rea-
sonable level of enforcement" of municipal housing codes.
the discovery of criminal evidence,'89 they may
nevertheless be personal in nature and highly in-
trusive. This is demonstrated by the judicial
authorization the government finally obtained in
Barlow's permitting the inspection to extend to
the establishment or other area, workplace, or en-
vironment where work is performed by employees
of the employer, Barlow's Inc., and to all pertinent
conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices,
equipment, materials, and all other things therein
(including but not limited to records, files, papers,
processes, controls, and facilities) bearing upon
whether Barlow's Inc. is furnishing to its employees
employment and a place of employment that are
free from recognized hazards that are causing or
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its
employees, and whether Barlow's Inc. is complying
with the Occupational Safety and Health Standards
promulgated ... pursuant to [the] Act.19°
Armed with such authority, an OSHA inspector
can obviously examine practically everything
on the premises, including written docu-
ments'9-something the inspector in Camara
clearly could not do. Moreover, by having broad
authority to check for the violation of any health
and safety standard, the inspector can conduct a
wide ranging inspection to ascertain whether over
4,000 promulgated standards have been
satisfied.'9
Given these possible distinctions of Camara, the
Court's summary treatment of the probable cause
issue in Barlow's cann6t be defended. In fact, the
Court should not have resolved the issue at all,
" The government's brief indicated that catching vi-
olators was more important to OSHA administrators
than inducing compliance with safety regulations. Brief
for Appellants at 38-40, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S.
Ct. 1816 (1978) (suggesting that advance notice of in-
spections would give employers an opportunity to conceal
or correct defects). See also Brief for Amicus Curiae for
Pacific Legal Foundation at 18, referring to the "cops
and robbers" mentality of the government's brief; Brief
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Amicus Curiae at 18: "Even assuming, arguendo,
that an employer were able to identify and correct all
possible violations while a warrant is obtained, then the
principle purpose of the Act, abatement of hazardous
conditions, will have been achieved."
'90 98 S. Ct. at 1823-24 n. 14. The government obtained
the order after the company refused entry to the OSHA
inspector.
Although the judicial order quoted in the text
appeared to permit the inspector to examine all relevant
records and files, the OSHA regulations authorize in-
spection only of those records required to be kept under
the Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1977).
'9 See note 186 supra.
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since it received only passing footnote reference in
the government's principal brief and less than three
pages of attention in the government's reply
briefE93 By addressing the issue and resblving it as
it did, the Court has suggested that the need for
traditional probable cause may be easily balanced
away on rather flimsy evidence, even when the
search at issue is highly intrusive. To so extend
Camara without full briefing and argument from
both sides is regrettable.
2. Probable Cause Based Upon A General Notion of
Reasonableness
The Camara balancing principle can affect either
the kind or degree of probable cause required in a
given context. In the administrative context, the
principle has usually affected the kind of required
cause. That is, probable cause in such cases is
usually not expressed in terms of probabilities or
suspicions of individual wrongdoing but instead,
as in Barlow's, in terms of the reasonableness of
governing administrative standards. In the crimi-
nal context, however, the balancing principle has
usually affected the degree of the requisite individ-
ualized cause. In the stop and frisk cases, for ex-
ample, the Court permitted police conduct to be
based upon reasonable suspicion rather than tra-
ditional probable cause,'9 and it justified this by
balancing the public need to prevent crime against
the limited intrusiveness of such police activity.
Two terms ago, the Court held in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte s95 that temporary stops and brief
questioning may be conducted at fixed checkpoints
near the border "in the absence of any individu-
alized suspicion."' 96 The Court did not even re-
quire administrative guidelines to determine the
appropriateness of any given stop, for "the Border
Patrol officers must have wide discretion in select-
ing the motorists to be diverted for the brief ques-
tioning involved."' 97 Throughout the opinion, the
Court emphasized that checkpoint stops constitute
'1 Brief for Appellants at 51 n.27; Reply Brief for
Appellants at 4-6, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct.
1816 (1978).
'u See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The
Court did not actually use the term reasonable suspicion
until United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975), but the Terry standard of cause could easily be
described by such a term. Cf LaFave, supra note 167, at
68 & 73-75 (using the terms "reasonable grounds to
suspect" and "substantial possibility"). Traditional prob-
able cause encompasses something close to a more-prob-
able-than-not standard. Id. at 73-74.
'9 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
'90Id. at 562.
'9 d at 563-64.
only a minimal intrusion upon fourth amendment
interests.1se Whether right or wrong on the facts
before it, the holding of Martinez-Fuerte was a logical
development of the Camara doctrine, which, in
effect, established a sliding scale approach to prob-
able cause issues: the most intrusive fourth amend-
ment activity-full arrests and full searches under
the criminal law-normally require an individu-
alized judgment of full, traditional probable cause;
somewhat lesser intrusions under the criminal
law-such as street stops and frisks-normally re-
quire an individualized judgment of cause, 199 but
something less than full, traditional probable
cause; investigations for civil purposes, which typ-
ically are less intrusive than investigations under
the criminal law,20 normally require objective ad-
ministrative guidelines but not individualized
cause; criminal or civil investigations that intrude
only marginally upon fourth amendment interests
require only a general assessment of reasonableness.
Martinez-Fuerte merely completed the continuum by
adding the last point.
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms,"1 by a per curiam
decision, the Court applied the test of simple rea-
sonableness to uphold a minor seizure of an auto-
mobile driver. ° There, two police officers stopped
the defendant for driving with an expired license
plate. One of the officers then asked the defendant
to step from the car. When the defendant did this,
the officer noticed a bulge under his sports jacket.
Fearing a gun, the officer frisked the defendant,
finding a .38 caliber revolver. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed' the defendant's subse-
quent conviction on gun charges.= Finding that
the initial detention was lawful and assuming that
the frisk was lawful once the officer observed the
bulge, the court nevertheless concluded that the
order to leave the car was an unlawful seizure,
Id at 562.
' Martinez-Fuerte recognized that "some quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure." Id at 560.
20 LaFave, supra note 182, at 18-20.
20 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
mCuriously, Minums did not cite Martinez-Fuerte, the
precedent most strongly supporting the Court's holding.
m Commonwealth v. Mimms, 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d
1157 (1977).
' In a separate part of its opinion, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that there was "little question"
that "the bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to
conclude that Mimnims was armed and thus posed a
serious and present danger to the safety of the officer."
434 U.S. at 112. No one dissented on this point. If the
mere observation of a bulge will always justify a frisk, the
reasonable suspicion standard cannot have much teeth.
1978
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because the officer had no factual basis to suspect
either criminal activity or the presence of
weapons.205 This illegal seizure, the court con-
cluded, tainted the subsequent frisk and required
suppression of the gun. The United States Supreme
Court summarily reversed.
The Court began its analysis by stating that
"reasonableness" was the appropriate test. To de-
termine reasonableness, the Court balanced the
public interest against the intrusiveness of the of-
ficer's conduct. Citing the dangers that confront
officers while engaged in traffic stops, the Court
found the safety of the officer a "legitimate and
weighty" justification for ordering the defendant
to leave the car.'m Turning to the defendant's
interests, the Court described the "incremental
intrusion''2°7 resulting from the order to leave the
car as "de minimis":t
°
The driver is being asked to expose to view very
little more of his person than is already exposed.
The police have already lawfully decided that the
driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is
whether he shall spend that period sitting in the
driver's seat of his car or standing alongside it. Not
only is the insistence of the police on the latter
choice not a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person," but it hardly rises to the level of a
"petty indignity." 209
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized
the Court for its summary disposition of the case.
Addressing the merits, Justice Stevens questioned
whether ordering a routine traffic offender out of
the car really enhances an officer's safety.a10 Justice
Stevens also questioned the Court's conclusion that
the driver's interest was negligible. Certain individ-
uals, he argued, may fear for their safety, object to
standing in the rain or cold, or be embarrassed
about not being fully dressed.2 1 ' Justice Stevens
also observed that the Court's logic necessarily
applies to passengers,21 2 and he further suggested
that the Court's holding means that whenever an
officer has occasion to speak with the driver of a
vehicle, he may order the driver from the car.
21
3
Although Justice Stevens was perhaps correct in
"2" 471 Pa. at 552, 370 A.2d at 1160.
as 434 U.S. at I11.
"
7 Id. at 110.21"Id. at I11.
" Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 342 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)).
21old. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
h1 Id. at 116.
2i2 Id. at 117. Accord, State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888
(Minn. 1978).
213 434 U.S. at 117.
his criticism of the Court's summary disposition of
Mimms, his discussion of the merits seems flawed.
Obviously, as he appeared to concede,2 14 the Court
has no business choosing the one procedure among
reasonable alternatives that would most enhance
an officer's safety.2 5 Turning to the driver's inter-
ests, Justice Stevens' hypotheticals seem
makeweight. Certainly the appropriate constitu-
tional rule should not turn on the possibility that
some people may occasionally run errands without
being fully clothed.2 16 Justice Stevens' observation
that the Court's holding necessarily applies to pas-
sengers seems correct, but nothing in his dissent
illustrates why ordering passengers to leave a
stopped car is unreasonable.
Justice Stevens appears to be most incorrect in
his suggestion that the majority's holding implies
that an officer can order anyone with whom he has
occasion to speak out of a car. The crux of the
Court's reasoning was that the driver had already
been inconvenienced by the initial interference
with his travels.2 17 Given this initial intrusion, the
214 Id. at 116.
215 In balancing the public's interest against that of the
individual, however, the disagreement among police ex-
perts about the safest procedure would be a relevant
consideration. The difference between taking disagree-
ment of experts into account in the balancing process
and appearing to resolve the disputes among experts is
subtle but nevertheless important in constitutional law.
Compare Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945) with Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,'Inc., 359 U.S.
520 (1959) and South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
216 Getting out of a car in inclement weather may, of
course, be rather annoying. The Court had to choose,
however, among three alternatives: a per se rule finding
an order to exit reasonable, a case-by-case assessment of
reasonableness, or a per se rule finding such an order
unreasonable. The latter would bejustified only ifJustice
Stevens' hypotheticals described fairly frequent occur-
rences. Atypical occurrences should not produce rigid
constitutional restraints, especially when so little in terms
of constitutional liberty is at stake. Left to choose among
the first two alternatives, the Court's selection of a per se
rule over case-by-case adjudication may make good sense.
Cf LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 127,
140-43 (P. Kurland ed.) (arguing that a per se approach
is most appropriate for police conduct that constitutes
only a minor intrusion into privacy interests).
21 Answering Justice Stevens, the Court said, "We
hold only that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully
detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may
order the driver to get out of the vehicle . .. ." 434 U.S.
at Ill n.6. 'As suggested in the text accompanying note
216 supra, the Court's reasoning seems equally applicable
to passengers. Stopping a car interferes with their travels
as much as it interferes with the driver's. The Court's
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intrusion of being forced to leave the car was "de
minimis". Without the initial intrusion, however,
the officer's demand would have effectuated the
initial seizure and thus have constituted a signifi-
cant intrusion requiring individualized cause.
The Court's holding in Mimms is important be-
cause it recognizes that the judiciary should not
measure an officer's each and every step with a
precisely calibrated vernier. Martinez-Fuerte had rec-
ognized much the same thing, but in the context
of fixed checkpoint stops, where there is substantial
administrative oversight, little if any surprise to the
motorist, and considerable public visibility. Mimms
proceeds to the next step by holding that some of
an individual officer's decisions on the street,-where
oversight, advance notice, and public visibility are
absent, need not be pigeonholed on the scale of
individualized cause.218 Mimms teaches that a test
no more specific than general reasonableness is
sufficient for minor intrusions that are incidental
to antecedent intrusions of a more serious nature,
which do require some degree of individualized
cause.
The reasonableness test, while imprecise and
prone to subjective judgments, simplifies the law
and permits adequate flexibility for the myriad
courses of action that may be open to an officer
temporarily confronting a person on the street.
This is especially so if the test is applied with
appropriate deference to the officer's judgments.1 9
rationale for allowing the officer to order the driver from
the car was not that the driver had already committed a
wrong and thus could not complain about the additional
inconvenience but rather that the initial inconvenience
overshadowed the subsequent one. The subsequent in-
convenience is equally de minimus for passengers. See
State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
2t3The Court in Martinez-Fuerte relied on all these
factors in rejecting the need for individualized cause.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559-62
(1976). The absence of these factors distinguishes United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), where the
Court held that the roving border patrol needs individ-
ualized suspicion to stop cars away from the border.
Brignoni-Ponce did not dictate a different result in Mn=
for the reason, already discussed, that the latter case
involved an initial intrusion justified by individualized
cause.2 19 An issue that pervades all constitutional adjudica-
tion is whether the Court should engage in strict scrutiny,
putting a heavy burden on the state tojustifi its conduct,
or apply a deferential test of rationality, allowing the
state to prevail even if reasonable people disagree on the
wisdom of the adopted policy. The latter approach seems
more appropriate in fourth amendment adjudication
when the individual interests involved are at the periph-
In any event, specific rules governing an officer's
every move would probably be unworkable. As
Professor LaFave recently remarked:
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all
sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be
the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds
of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be
"literally impossible of application by the officer in
the field. '2m
Of course, courts will still have the sometimes
difficult task of determining whether a given intru-
sion is sufficiently minor to justify analysis under
the flexible reasonableness standard. In the context
of street encounters, courts after Mimms will fre-
quently have to decide whether a given course of
conduct adds only marginally to a serious, anteced-
ent intrusion or instead constitutes a significant
additional intrusion requiring individualized jus-
tification. Clearly, for example, a frisk cannot be
considered just a "de minimus" incremental intru-
sion following a lawful stop, 1 nor can a temporary
detention at the station.222 Whether returning a
lawfully stopped person to a crime scene for possi-
ble identification should require separate and
greaterjustification is a difficult question, one that
may depend upon factors such as the distance to
be traveled and the time consumed. 3 While gray
areas obviously remain, the reasonableness test,
especially as it gets developed and applied, should
nevertheless provide some badly needed breathing
space both for courts seeking to establish a coherent
body of fourth amendment doctrine and for officers
ery of fourth amendment concerns. Set also note 215, and
accompanying text supra.
20LaFave, supra note 216, at 141.
2i Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) specifically rejected
the view that a frisk is a petty indignity. In MimsJustice
Stevens said, "If this new rule is truly predicated on a
safety rationale ... it should also justify a frisk for
weapon., or at least an order directing the driver to lean
on the hood of the car with legs and arms spread out."
434 U.S. at 123. This analysis fails to recognize that such
police conduct is more than a de minimis incremental
intrusion to the initial stop. At least as long as Teny
survives, the concern for safety, absent specific facts
indicating a risk of danger, cannot outweigh the major
intrusion of such police conduct.
2See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
m Cf. ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARiAiGNMENTr Po-
cz~Rnu § 110.2 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) (allow-
ing an officer to stop a person on reasonable suspicion
and detain the individual "near" the place of initial
detention, but for no more than twenty minutes, to
obtain an identification).
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faced with the task of quick decisionmaking on the
street.24
B. THE BALANCING TEST: REQUIRING MORE THAN TRA-
DITIONAL PROBABLE CAUSE
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,22 police with tradi-
tional probable cause oktained a warrant to search
the offices of a student newspaper for photographic
evidence of previous campus violence. The warrant
affidavit did not suggest that any members of the
paper were involved in the unlawful conduct. Pur-
suant to the warrant, police searched the paper's
offices, including photographic laboratories, filing
cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but not
including locked rooms and drawers. The search
was unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter, the paper
brought a civil rights action against the police, and
the federal district court issued a declaratory judg-
ment that the search violated the paper's first and
fourth amendment rights. 226 The court concluded
that the fourth amendment prohibits a search of
premises belonging to a person not suspected of
crime unless probable cause exists that a subpoena
duces tecum would be impractical. In addition, the
court concluded that the first amendment requires
even more stringent protection for the press.2 27 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court, 8 but
the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice White, reversed.
The Court began its analysis by observing that
"it is an understatement to say that there is no
direct authority.., for the District Court's sweep-
ing revision of the Fourth Amendment." 229 Existing
law, the Court maintained, permits the search of
224 Cases like the following should be much easier after
Mimms. An officer, acting on a citizen's complaint, inves-
tigated two men sitting in a car outside a house. Both
men indicated they were waiting for a woman who had
gone into the house. The officer then ordered the men to
accompany him to the house to check the story. Assuming
the officer had grounds to detain the men in the car for
- temporary questioning, the order to accompany him to
the house seems eminently reasonable. See People v.
Rivers, 42 Mich. App. 561, 202 N.W. 2d 498 (1972)
(upholding the officer's conduct on reasonableness
grounds).
25 9 8 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
227 The court required a "clear showing that (1) im-
portant materials will be destroyed or removed from the
jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order will be futile." Id.
at 135.
m Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1977) (adopting the opinion of the district court).
2 98 S. Ct. at 1975.
any place on probable cause that evidence will be
found. But the fourth amendment does not require
probable cause to believe that the person whose
premises are to be searched was involved in the
crime.' Quoting Camara, the Court noted "that in
criminal investigations, a warrant to search for
recoverable items is reasonable 'only when there is
probable cause to believe they will be uncovered
in a particular dwelling."'23 The Court also relied
on Camara for the proposition that "a less stringent
standard of probable cause is acceptable where the
entry is not to secure evidence of crime against the
possessor." 32 The Court then added,
The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the bal-
ance between privacy and public need, and there is
no occasion or justification for a court to revise the
Amendment and strike a new balance by denying
the search warrant in the circumstances present
here and by insisting that the investigation proceed
by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory that
the latter is a less intrusive alternative, or other-
wise.m
Although confidently articulated, the Court's
reasoning appears questionable. Camara, first of all,
did not hold that a less stringent standard of
probable cause is acceptable when the entry is not
aimed at securing evidence of crime against the
possessor. Rather, as previously discussed, Camara
held that a less stringent standard of cause was
permissible in the specific context of municipal
housing inspections.23 In justifying its conclusion,
the Camara Court did" observe that housing inspec-
tions are not aimed at the discovery of criminal
evidence,m but as Professor LaFave noted some
time ago, this rationale only makes sense if under-
stood as suggesting that housing inspections, be-
cause of their limited objective, are not as intrusive
as a typical search for criminal evidence.235 The
MIn effect, the Court held that a search of premises
requires "search probable cause," but not "offender prob-
able cause." See Haddad, supra note 31, at 214-15. The
newspaper had argued that a search warrant should not
issue unless there is probable cause to believe that some-
one connected with the premises is a wrongdoer (i.e.,
offender probable cause) or that someone connected with
the premises would destroy or conceal the desired evi-
dence.
2 1 98 S. Ct. at 1976 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).
m 98 S. Ct. at 1976.
23Id. at 1978.
2m See notes 180-93 supra. But see note 180 and accom-
panying text supra.
387 U.S. at 537.
LaFave, supra note 182, at 17-20. In Michigan v.
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search in Zurcher, unlike that in Camara, involved
extensive rummaging.
More significantly, the Zurcher Court begged the
question with its conclusion that the fourth amend-
ment only requires probable cause for searches.
The real question in Zurcher, as Justice Stevens
recognized in his dissent, concerned "what kind of
'probable cause' must be established in order to
obtain a warrant to conduct an unannounced
search for documentary evidence in the private
files of a person not suspected of involvement in
any criminal activity. ,237 The Court's accusation
that the district court revised the fourth amend-
ment by balancing the public need against the
intrusiveness of the search has the distinct flavor of
the dissents in Camara and Barlow's.
As discussed in the previous section, the Camara
balancing principle can affect either the kind or
degree of probable cause required in a given con-
text.? Applying Camara and Barlow's, it is at least
tenable to suggest that probable cause in third
party contexts requires a showing that administra-
tive procedures will not suffice to obtain the evi-
dence. That is, in third party contexts, the kind of
probable cause perhaps should differ from that
found acceptable in first party searches. Or, apply-
ing the principle underlying Martinez-Fuerte and
Minms, it is at least tenable to suggest that only a
Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978), the Court held that entries
into buildings to investigate the cause of a fire must be
made according to the test set out in Camara. If, however,
the authorities are seeking evidence of arson, they must
have traditional probable cause. Id. at 1950, 1951. The
Court provided no supporting rationale for the distinc-
tion, but its holding is consistent with Professor LaFave's
thesis. An arson investigation is normally much more
intrusive than an investigation to determine the cause of
a fire:
[Tihe arson investigator may look at the goods,
clothing and furnishings remaining on the premises
.... He might seize and examine the records and
personal papers found on the premises. Or he might
seal off the premises from everyone, including the
owner, in order to preserve evidence. Those inves-
tigations far exceed the physical intrusion by some-
one who just wants to determine the cause of a fire.
Respondent's Brief at 19-20, Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct.
1942 (1978).
2 98 S. Ct. at 1987 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This
assertion by Justice Stevens is rather remarkable given
his dissenting opinions in Barlow's and Tyler. See the text
at notes 171-79 supra. In Zurcher, Justices White and
Stevens seem to have traded doctrinal positions.
In fairness to the Court, however, it should be noted
that none of the briefs stated the issue in terms of the
Camara balancing principle.
m See notes 198-201 and accompanying text supra.
strong probability that evidence will be found
should justify a search of third party premises:
third party searches should perhaps require a
higher degree of individualized probable cause
than first party searches. By virtually ignoring
these possibilities, however, the Court in Zurcher
unfortunately suggested that the sliding scale ap-
proach to probable cause issues has a downward
slope but no upward ladder.3
9
After chastising the lower court for revising the
fourth amendment with a balancing analysis, the
Zurcher Court proceeded nevertheless to consider
the reasoning behind the lower court's "remarkable
conclusion."20 As the Court observed, the state's
interest in obtaining evidence does not vary as a
function of whether the individual to be searched
is a suspect. Focusing on the individual's interests,
the Court reasoned that since a warrant will inform
the person about the desired evidence, "it is doubt-
ful that he should then be permitted to object to
the search ... and insist that the officers serve him
with a subpoena duces lecum.' 24' This, like the
wrongdoer approach rejected in Tyler and Mincey,
appears to be a bootstrap argument, for notice will
provide an opportunity to disclose the evidence
only if the evidence is in fact on the premises to be
searched.
More persuasively, the Court reasoned that a
seemingly innocent third party may turn out, after
further investigation, not to be innocent at all. A
subpoena duces tecum in such instances would give
a guilty party, or one sympathetic to the guilty
party, sufficient opportunity to destroy or conceal
the evidence.Y2 Moreover, the Court continued,
requiring a subpoena may not significantly en-
hance privacy interests, since subpoenas, unlike
search warrants, do not require a showing of prob-
able cause.,
While this latter reasoning seems to be more
justifiable, it cannot substitute for the thorough
balancing of interests required by Camaro. First, as
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, subpoenas
239 Soon after Camara was decided, Professor LaFave
recognized that its rationale called for a higher than
ordinary standard of probable cause "when the intrusion
is particularly severe." LaFave, supra note 167, at 55 n.82.
See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 68-69 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
24°98 S. Ct. at 1979.
241 Id.
242 Id The paper in Zurcher was sympathetic to the
students involved in the campus violence. Id. at 1983 n. I
(Powell, J., concurring).
2 98 S. Ct. at 1980.
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seemed to satisfy the public's need for obtaining
items of mere evidence, such as photographs and
documents, when the so-called mere evidence rule
precluded such items from being seized in a tradi-
tional search.2" For such items at least, the Court's
fear of destruction or concealment of evidence may
be overstated.2" Second, the Court never did con-
sider the intrusiveness of third party searches.
While search warrants do require traditional prob-
able cause and thus provide a modicum of protec-
tion that subpoenas do not,2" they, unlike sub-
poenas, permit a careful rummaging through pos-
sessions until the desired items are found or all
possible places of concealment are eliminated. A
search for documentary evidence is a paradigm of
intrusiveness, since it can extend into virtually
every nook and cranny and must inevitably in-
trude, at least to some extent, into the privacies of
documents not subject to seizure.247
Even if these factors are not ultimately deter-
minative, the fact that the party to be searched is
a newspaper may tip the scales in the direction of
a higher standard of probable cause. The Court
conceded that the fourth amendment emerged
from the historic struggle between the Crown and
the press, " but it concluded that the fourth
amendment's probable cause requirement struck
the appropriate balance of interests.2 9justice Pow-
ell, in his concurring opinion, reiterated this theme
by noting that nothing in the wording of the fourth
amendment suggests that the press should receive
protections not available to others.25° But, of
course, nothing in the wording of the fourth
amendment suggests that housing inspections,
: 98 S. Ct. at 1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Until
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), a search warrant
could only be obtained for contraband, stolen items, or
instrumentalities of crime. "Mere evidence" was immune.
By abrogating this rule, Hayden continued the trend of
freeing search and seizure law from property concepts.
2 In Justice Stevens' words, probable cause to search
for contraband, stolen goods, or instrumentalities sup-
ports an inference "that the custodian is involved in
criminal activity, and that, if given notice, he will conceal
or destroy what is being sought." 98 S. Ct. at 1990. A
special rule for third party searches, he argued, is thus
necessary only when items of mere evidence are involved,
for in such instances no inference of wrongdoing on the
part of the custodian is justified. Id.
2" Since a subpoena can only be enforced in ajudicial
proceeding, an objecting party at least obtains the op-
portunity to present his objections in an adversary pro-
ceeding.247 See McKenna, supra note 135, at 67-70.
2" 98 S. Ct. at 1981.
9 Id. at 1981-82.
2 0 Id. at 1983 (Powell, J., concurring).
street stops, frisks and orders to exit a stopped car
are deserving of less scrutiny than traditional ar-
rests and searches. Similarly, nothing in the word-
ing of the fourth amendment suggests that houses
deserve more protection than cars; yet, relying at
least in part on considerations of intrusiveness, the
Court has consistently made such a distinction."
The point is simply that when the issue is correctly
perceived as one involving the kind of probable
cause needed to justify a search warrant, the his-
torical concerns of the fourth amendment may
dictate a particularly rigorous answer. The framers
no more answered this question than they did other
probable cause questions for which the Court has
found a balancing analysis appropriate.
In summary, Zurcher is a poorly reasoned deci-
sion. The Court erred first by failing to state the
issue in terms of the sliding scale model of probable
cause
2 52 
and by suggesting that a balancing ap-
proach was inappropriate. Moreover, even where
it did undertake to balance the interests, the Court
failed to present a complete analysis. This is not to
say that the Court's ultimate holding is wrong.
Such a conclusion mandates a more complete bal-
ancing of interests than that undertaken here. Nev-
ertheless, the above analysis, albeit brief, must at
least raise doubts about the holding as well as the
underlying reasoning.
C. THE BALANCING TEST: EVIDENTIARY SUBPOENAS
AND PARTICIPANT MONITORING
Earlier in this article, arguments were made that
both participant monitoring and certain eviden-
tiary subpoenas implicate fourth amendment in-
terests.2 " Assuming that these arguments have
merit, the task remains of developing a standard of
reasonableness for such searches. The initial ques-
tion, suggested by the last two sections, is whether
a standard of traditional probable cause or some
different standard of justification should be
adopted.
Evidentiary subpoenas are the easier of the two
procedures to analyze. Subpoenas for evidence are
far less intrusive than traditional searches, as the
student newspaper in Zurcher obviously recog-
nized. 2"' 4 A subpoena does not entitle an officer to
251 As the Court stated in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976), "one's expectation of
privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation
are significantly different from the traditional expecta-
tion of privacy and freedom in one's residence."
252 But see note 237 supra.
253 See sections II B (1) & (2) supra.
254 See McKenna, supra note 135, at 89.
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trespass upon private property nor to rummage
through private possessions looking for the desired
evidence.2 Unless a subpoena is overbroad-and
overbreadth has long been a recognized ground for
challenging a subpoena2---it directs the recipient
to the specific items desired by the investigator.
Finally, if the recipient refuses to comply, the party
serving the subpoena must seek judicial enforce-
ment, thus giving the recipient or an appropriate
party a chance to air his objections in an adversary
proceeding.2 7 No such opportunity exists, of
course, before a traditional search is conducted.
This is not to say that subpoenas are not intrusive
at all. They can, as earlier discussed, infringe upon
informational privacy, and it is this infringement
that justifies some degree of fourth amendment
scruiny.m Moreover, in some instances, a sub-
poena may seem just as intrusive as the more
traditional search. In the previously described let-
ter hypothetical, for example, there seems to be
little difference in terms of intrusions upon infor-
mational privacy between the opening and reading
of the letter and the issuance of a subpoena to one
of the parties to disclose its contents. Similarly, in
the Katz hypothetical2 ° the informational privacy
of a telephone conversation may be infringed just
as much by a subpoena as by electronic surveil-
lance. Nevertheless, even in these hypotheticals,
differences between the two procedures do exist.
Most importantly, the recipient, or an appropriate
party, can always obtain a judicial hearing by
refusing to honor the subpoena. At such a hearing,
the person objecting can claim that portions of the
letter or phone conversation are purely personal
and totally irrelevant to whatever investigation is
in progress. When the subpoena is for documentary
evidence-like the letter itself-the individual can
ask the court to excise the irrelevant portions. Of
course, when the subpoena seeks oral testimony,
the individual can personally prevent the disclosure
of that which is private and irrelevant.
From the perspective of.the public's interest, it
would also be difficult to subject the subpoena
power to full traditional probable cause. Like mu-
nicipal housing inspections, the practice of issuing
subpoenas without traditional probable cause has
2-s See the quote from Justice McKenna in the text at
note 136, supra.
2wee Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
7Se LaFave, supra note 182, at 31.
2m It bears emphasis again that only subpoenas that
infringe upon informational privacy intrude upon fourth
amendment interests. See note 144 supra.
2See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
2 See note 146 and accompanying text supra.
been accepted for many years.26l Moreover, some
administrative agencies, like the Internal Revenue
Service, would literally be crippled by a require-
ment of traditional probable cause. Random spot
checks, in which taxpayers are asked to reveal their
financial records, are necessary if the system of
voluntary income tax reporting is to succeed. Sim-
ilarly, grand juries would be hampered severely in
performing an investigative function if traditional
probable cause had to precede an investigation.=
Balancing the great public need against the
degree of intrusiveness, a strong case can be made
for equating probable cause in the administrative
subpoena context with the Camara standard of
reasonableness for certain administrative
searches.m That is, when a person can show that
a subpoena interferes with his or her informational
privacy interests, the government should have to
show that "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for ... [issuing the subpoena] are satis-
fied with respect to ... [the] particular ... [indi-
vidual].,, 2' At a minimum, this would require the
government to show that the investigation "is au-
thorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can
order, and the documents sought are relevant to
the inquiry." Equally important, however, the
government should have to show, as the Court
required in Barlow's, that the particular person has
been selected for investigation "on the basis of a
26 Speaking of subpoenas, Justice Murphy said over
thirty years ago, "It is not without difficulty that I dissent
from a procedure the constitutionality of which has been
established for many years." Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218 (1946).
__ The investigative role of the grand jury has long
been recognized as legitimate. See, e.g., Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
' In See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967), the
Court said:
It is now settled that, when an administrative
agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the
Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be
sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose,
and specific in directive. ... In addition, while the
demand to inspect may be issued by the agency... it
may not be made and enforced by the inspector in
the field, and the subpoenaed party may obtain
judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand
prior to suffering the penalties for refusing to com-
ply.
It is these rather minimal limitations on admin-
istrative action which we think are constitutionally
required in the case of investigative entry upon
commercial establishments.
'Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967).
__ Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
209 (1946). The full quote is provided in note 167, supra.
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general administrative plan for the enforcement of
the [applicable] Act derived from neutral
sources."
6 Such a requirement would prevent
mere harassment of unpopular individuals.
2 67
When a subpoena is not issued as part of a
general administrative plan, the government
should have to show individualized reasonable sus-
picion. Not to require this would be to permit mere
fishing expeditions that intrude upon informa-
tional privacy interests protected by the fourth
amendment. When a grand jury is investigating a
particular incident, or a particular concern such as
local corruption, it should not have carte blanche
access to information encompassed within the
fourth amendment protection of informational pri-
vacy. A showing of reasonable suspicion would not
severely hamper the investigative function in such
cases.
To some, these minimal standards may appear
less than adequate268 Concededly, they would not
significantly impede current practices, nor should
they. An enormously heavy burden would have to
be carried by a person advocating a standard of
reasonableness that would make it impossible for
the IRS to administer the tax law or the grand jury
to function as an investigative institution. On the
other hand, however, the advocated standards
would prevent the abuse made possible by cases
like Miller, where a bank depositor was left with no
fourth amendment protection whatsoever for the
informational privacy of his bank records2i Under
the Miller doctrine, the government can examine
the bank records of anyone and everyone with no
real purpose in mind. Under the proposed stan-
dards, an objecting depositor would be entitled to
a showing of administrative reasonableness or in-
dividualized suspicion. And while agencies like the
IRS may often be able to show administrative
reasonableness, others, like the FBI, would be re-
m, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1825
(1978).
27 These requirements will not overly tax the admin-
istrative process even when third-party subpoenas are
involved. As previously discussed, if the third party de-
sires to comply with a subpoena, the individual whose
privacy interests are implicated is subject to the law of
third-party consent. See the text at notes 158-60, supra.
Moreover, although the IRS has an enormous workload,
Congress has seen fit to require it to notify a bank
customer of the right to challenge in court a summons
for bank records. See Comment, supra note 122, at 646.
2,8 Cf McKenna, supra note 135, at 89-90 (arguing for
a more stringent standard for documentary subpoenas).
The facts in Miller are discussed in the text at notes
117-27 supra.
strained by the fourth amendment absent a show-
ing of individualized suspicion. 
°
The practice of participant monitoring presents
problems much tougher than those associated with
evidentiary subpoenas. The target of a spy, unlike
the recipient of a subpoena, has no opportunity, of
course, for a prior judicial hearing. Moreover, a
spy necessarily must intrude on much that is lawful
to detect the unlawful. In terms of informational
privacy, therefore, a spy necessarily intrudes
broadly upon privacy interests. It may be signifi-
cant, however, that the person being spied upon,
unlike the target of a traditional search, can control
the information disclosed. While the officer execut-
ing a traditional search may turn over every stone
in the quest for the desired items,2 7i the spy must
depend upon the target's willingness to disclose.
Although it cannot be said, as previously discussed,
that the willingness to disclose negates reasonable
expectations of privacy against government, it per-
haps may fairly be said that such willingness limits
somewhat the intrusiveness of the government's
activity.
The public's need for police spying absent a
showing of traditional probable cause is difficult to
evaluate. Putting aside political cases, most police
spying occurs in areas, such as vice enforcement,
where evidence is difficult to obtain.2 12 On the
other hand, it has been noted that police usually
engage in undercover surveillance only when they
270 The FBI obviously has no administrative tasks to
perform that would justify spot-check investigations like
those undertaken by the IRS. Moreover, Congress has
not given the FBI subpoena power. In any event, just as
the Camara rule for administrative inspections should not
unthinkingly be applied to all administrative agencies,
see notes 180-93 and accompanying text supra, the stan-
dard of administrative reasonableness should not neces-
sarily be sufficient for the subpoenas of all administrative
agencies. The public interest should always be balanced
against the degree of intrusiveness.
Interestingly, the subpoenas for the bank records in
Miller, although nominally issued by an investigating
grand jury, were prompted by an investigation of liquor
law violations undertaken by agents from the Treasury
Department's Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Unit.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). Under
the views expressed in the text, such subpoenas could not
be enforced without individualized reasonable suspicion.
From the facts disclosed in the opinion, the government
may have had not only reasonable suspicion but full
traditional probable cause. Id.
27i Of course, the officer may not look in places where
the desired items could not be concealed. See LaFave,
Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures
Into the "Quagmire," 8 CiUM. L. BULL. 9, 26 (1972).
272 L. TIFFANY, D. McINmYE, & D. ROTENBERC; DE-
"TECTION OF CRIME 207-82 (1967).
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have at least a reasonable suspicion of wrongdo-ing.273
Without further evidence concerning the need
for police spying, it can only be said at this point
that a standard of reasonable suspicion is the mini-
mum that should be required. Such a standard
would take into account the uncertainty about the
actual need for police spying and the somewhat
lesser nature of the intrusion upon informational
privacy. Further analysis, however, may suggest a
basis for employing a standard somewhere between
reasonable suspicion and traditional probable
cause and perhaps even demonstrate that the tra-
ditional standard would not be so extreme.
IV
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT REAFFIRMED
If this term's search and seizure cases sounded
one clear message, it was that "the bulwark of
Fourth Amendment protection ... is the War-
rant Clause, requiring that, absent certain excep-
tions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and
disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a
search."'' 4 Reaffirming Camara and See v. Seattle,275
the Court during the term held that this rule
applies "during civil as well as criminal investiga-
tions"276 and to searches of "commercial premises
as well as homes. ' ' " In Barlow's, the Court refused
to create a special exception for OSHA inspections.
It rejected the government's arguments that war-
rantless inspections are necessary to preserve the
element of surprise and that a warrant requirement
would provide only marginal protection for an
employer's privacy interests. Concerning the latter,
the Court said,
A warrant ... would provide assurances from a
neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable
under the Constitution, is authorized by statute,
and is pursuant to an administrative plan contain-
ing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant would
then and there advise the owner of the scope and
objects of the search, beyond which limits the in-
spector is not expected to proceed.m
23Id. at 274, 281.
24 Franks v. Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2681 (1978).275387 U.S. 541 (1967). See, a companion case to
Camara, involved an inspection of commercial premises.
' Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1820
(1978).
277 Id. at 1820.2'8 Id. at 1826.
In Tyler,2 79 the Court rejected a similar argument
that a warrant requirement for post-fire investiga-
tions would not serve any purpose. Attempting to
distinguish Camara, the prosecutor had argued that
"the fact of a fire is so readily ascertainable that
there seems to be little need for individualized
review." ° The Court conceded that "a fire vic-
tim's privacy must normally yield to the vital social
objective of ascertaining the cause of the fire, ' ' 81
but it maintained nevertheless that a warrant re-
quirement would help keep the invasion to a mini-
mum.8 Describing the magistrate's duty as one of
"particularized inquiry," the Court indicated that
"the number of prior entries, the scope of the
search, the time of day when it is proposed to be
made, the lapse of time since the fire, the continued
use of the building, and the owner's efforts to secure
it against intruders" would be relevant factors for
the magistrate to consider.' The Court also noted,
as it had in Barlow's, that a warrant would advise
the owner or occupant of both the investigator's
authority to search and the scope of the authorized
investigation.
Mince v. Arizona2' involved a murder scene
search and thus, like Tyler, presented a situation in
which probable cause for the initial intrusion
would rarely, if ever, be contestable. Nevertheless,
again stressing the warrant's function of limiting
the scope of a search, the Court refused to create a
murder scene exception to the warrant require-
ment. The Court also rejected the argument that
the search in issue could be justified under an
emergency rationale. It noted that all the persons
in the apartment had been located before the
search began, and it expressed incredulity at the
suggestion that a four day search could be justified
under an emergency theory.
Shortly after Camara and See, Professor LaFave
expressed doubt that those decisions had signifi-
cantly advanced individual rights.m His doubt, of
course, was prompted by the de minimus role
imposed upon the magistrate by the reduced stan-
dard of probable cause.m Little would be gained
by repeating Professor LaFave's arguments here,
Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
o Brief for Petitioner at 17, Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S.
Ct. 1942 (1978).
2' 98 S. Ct. at 1949.
snId.
2 Id.
2' 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978).
LaFave, supra note 182, at 37.




except to note that they generally apply to Barlow's
and Tyler as well. Indeed, the company in Barlow's
maintained that application of the Camara stan-
dards to OSHA inspections would result in "rubber
stamp warrants. ' ' ss7 The Court did, however, drop
some subtle hints that the magistrate should at
least occasionally say no. The Barlow's Court did,
for example, note that the government, in obtain-
ing judicial authorization, had referred to the in-
spection at issue as part of a general program
designed to assure compliance with the Act, but
the Court also observed that the government had
described neither the program nor Barlow's con-
nection with it.m Similarly, by recognizing the
number of previous entries, the lapse of time since
the fire and the owner's efforts to secure the build-
ing as relevant factors for the magistrate to con-
sider, the Court in Tyler seemed to be suggesting
that a fire investigation at some point would be
unreasonable. Even assuming, however, that the
Court seriously intended to convey this message in
Barlow's and Tyler, it may still be doubted that it
provided the magistrate enough clout to impeach
Professor LaFave's reservations about the warrant
procedure serving as a check on administrative
action.
Whatever the merits of the warrant requirement
in the administrative context, the facts in Barlow's
and Tyler were not conducive to abandonment of
the Camara doctrine.m In Barlow's, the government
sought a far reaching power of inspection that
seemed to include virtually everything on the
premises including business records. m Moreover,
the briefs against the government recounted in-
stances of abuse and possible harassment by OSHA
inspectors.29l In .Tyler, fire investigators returned to
27 Brief for Appellee at 53, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
2"8 98 S. Ct. at 1826 n.20. The government obtained a
judicial order for the inspection after the employer re-
fused to admit the OSHA inspector onto the premises.
2" It should be noted that Professor LaFave did not
support the dissenting opinion in Camara, which favored
outright rejection of the warrant requirement. Rather,
Professor LaFave maintained that the warrant protection
would not suffice to protect individual rights, and ac-
cordingly he suggested that administrative warrants
should be enforceable only after a recalcitrant owner has
been given an opportunity to be heard in court. LaFave,
supra note 182, 27-32. Set also Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S.
Ct. 1942, 1952-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
'" The judicial order the government finally obtained
in Barlow's is quoted in the text at note 190, supra.
•2' See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 46 n.36, Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978), referring to one case
in which an employer was inspected seven times for the
the premises the morning after the fire and on
several occasions during the next few weeks. During
the course of their visits, the investigators removed
pieces of carpet, sections of the stairway' and
business records.m While the facts in these cases
thus suggested a need to control at least the scope
of the respective searches, the reasons presented by
the government and state for abandoning the war-
rant requirement were far from convincing. In
Barlow's, the government expressed despair over
the loss of surprise that would result from a warrant
requirement, even though existing OSHA regula-
tions provided an opportunity for a recalcitrant
employer to have a pre-inspection adversary hear-
ing in court.2 In Tyler, the state devoted most of
its brief to the argument that arsonists do not have
privacy expectations and innocent victims do not
resent inspections;s the state completely ignored
the question of unnecessary intrusion raised by the
repeated visits to the burned premises.
Mincey, of course, was a much tougher case than
Barlow's or Tyler in terms of abandoning the war-
rant requirement, for it involved the search of a
home for evidence of crime, the quintessential ex-
ample of the warrant- requirement. Nevertheless,
the murder occurred after the officer-victim, in
undercover capacity and accompanied by other
plain clothes officers, had entered the defendant's
premises ostensibly to make a purchase of narcotics.
To require a warrant in such circumstances cer-
tainly seems to suggest a "rubber stamp" function
for the magistrate. To excuse the warrant require-
ment on this basis, however, would open up a
Pandora's box. For example, when an officer per-
sonally observes stolen goods or narcotics in a
certain dwelling, there is normally as little for the
magistrate to evaluate as in murder scene cases. Of
course, the officer's credibility may be a consider-
ation for the magistrate in such situations, but it
conceivably could also be a consideration in Mincey
cases. One could perhaps attempt to distinguish
same noise standard and acquitted each time, and an-
other case in which inspectors attempted to inspect the
employer's home because he permitted employees to keep
their lunches in his home refrigerator.
m 98 S. Ct. at 1946.
23 Brief for Respondent at 2, Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S.
Ct. 1942 (1978). The Court's opinion does not refer to
the seizure of business records.
294 98 S. Ct. at 1822-24.
29' The prosecutor's argument is discussed in the text
at notes 59-65, supra. The prosecutor stuck to the same
misguided theme throughout the brief. See, e.g., Brief for
Petitioner at 21-22, Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942
(1978).
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the credibility problem in murder scene cases from
that in other cases, but this would be a weak
theoretical reed for a new exception to the warrant
requirement.9
Not surprisingly, therefore, the state attempted
to justify the proposed murder scene exception
under an emergency rationale, the rationale that
underlies most warrant exceptions. The Mincey
Court recognized that an emergency theory would
justify some search activity such as a quick look for
other victims or offenders.297 The Court even rec-
ognized that a warrantless search for evidence
would sometimes be permissible, as in situations
presenting a danger that evidence might be lost,
destroyed or removed.298 The facts in Mince, how-
ever, like thqse in Barlow's and Tyler, did little to
advance the cause for the legality of the search at
issue. First, as previously noted, the officers had
accounted for all of the occupants and a police
guard minimized the possibility that evidence
would be destroyed.m More significantly, the
search lasted four days, extended to virtually every
nook and cranny of the apartment, and resulted in
.the seizure of over two hundred items.
300
In summary, Barlow's, Tyler, and Mincey reaf-
firmed the traditional warrant requirement. Bar-
low's and Tyler did this in the administrative search
context, where the Court has found the intrusion
upon privacy interests less significant than in crim-
inal cases and where it accordingly has reduced the
traditional probable cause requirement to one of
administrative reasonableness, thus leaving little
for the magistrate to assess. Mincey reaffirmed the
principle in the context of a criminal investigation,
but one in which the facts left little for the magis-
trate's independent judgment. All three cases ex-
pressed a reluctance to create new exceptions to
Cf United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)
("Even though on this record the issuance of a warrant
by a judicial officer was reasonably predictable, a line
must be drawn.")
2" 98 S. Ct. at 2414.
Id. at 2414-15. See also id. at 2421 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring and dissenting) suggesting that the police had
to conduct an immediate examination of blood stains.
2Id. at 2415. The reference to the police guard is
important, because it suggests an answer to the question
left open in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), where
the Court did not permit a search of a dwelling even
though the defendant's mother and brother arrived on
the scene shortly after his arrest. Although Vale thus
seemed to involve exigent circumstances, Mincey suggests
that seizing the house by posting a guard is a lesser
intrusion than a warrantless search. Compare the discus-
sion of the automobile cases in section III B infra.
. 'a96 S. CL. at 2412 (1978).
the warrant requirement. Mincey, in addition, sug-
gested a reluctance to create new exceptions in the
criminal context absent a real emergency, and it
stressed the need for a warrantless search to be
"strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation. ' '3° ' Finally, each case recdg-
nized that the need to control the scope of a search
may be as important, in terms of imposing a war-
rant requirement, as the need to determine whether
the search should occur in the first place.
B. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION RECONSIDERED
In Chambers v. Maronev,W2 the Supreme Court
permitted a warrantless search of an automobile as
part of a criminal investigation even though exi-
gent circumstances were not really present.' After
a gas station robbery, police, with full probable
cause, stopped a station wagon and arrested its
occupants. The police then drove the car to the
station, where a warrantless search yielded several
items of evidence. In upholding the search, the
Court first reaffirmed the long settled doctrine that
a search warrant is unnecessary "where there is
probable cause to search an automobile stopped on
the highway, the car is movable, the occupants are
alerted, and the car's contents may never be found
again if a warrant is obtained."o' The Court noted
that even in such circumstances an argument could
31 Id. at 2414 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
25-26 (1968)).
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
Chambers was not the first case to uphold a warrant-
less automobile search for criminal evidence, but it ap-
pears to be the first to do so without regard to exigent
circumstances. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), police stopped and searched a moving vehicle.
The exigency arose not just from the mobility of the car
but from the fact that the officers could not arrest the
occupants, since the suspected crime was a misdemeanor
not committed in their presence. See LaFave, supra note
271, at 18 n.36. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931), also upheld a warrantless search of a car, but the
Court used an emergency rationale, although its appli-
cation of that rationale may seem dubious.
Prior to Chambers, the Court had gone back and forth
in another series of automobile cases. Compare Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) and
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) with Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Unlike Chambers, these
cases are better understood as raising a question about
the lawfulness of inventory searches of cars lawfully in
police custody. Inventory searches may be subject to
restraints that do not apply to searches conducted as part
of a criminal investigation. See South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
o 399 U.S. at 51, describing this as the holding of
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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be made that it would be a lesser intrusion to seize
the car and obtain a warrant for the search. How-
ever, the Court rejected this argument and ex-
plained that:
[W]hich is the "greater" and which the "lesser"
intrusion is... a debatable question and the an-
swer may depend upon a variety of circumstances.
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference
between on the one hand seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant:"05
In Chambers, however, the car had in fact been
seized before the search; the occupants were in
custody and were thus unable to move the car.
Nevertheless, employing similar rationale, the
Court upheld the warrantless search at the station.
The Court noted that:
On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could
have been searched on the spot when it was stopped
since there was probable cause to search and it was
a fleeting target for a search. The probable cause
factor still obtained at the station house and so did
the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amend-
ment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and
the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is
secured. In that event there is little to choose in
terms of practical consequences between an imme-
diate search without a warrant and the car's im-
mobilization until a warrant is obtained.30
The Court in Chambers did not explain its some-
what dubious assertion that a warrantless search is




In subsequent cases, however, the Court began to
develop an argument that a person has less of an
expectation of privacy in a car than in other places,
such as a home. In Cardwell v. Lewis," the Court
reasoned that a car's primary function is transpor-
tation and that it seldom serves as a repository of
personal effects. The Cardwell Court also noted that
a car "travels public thoroughfares where both its
occupants and its contents are in plain view." 3 9 In
3 399 U.S. at 51-52. For a brief discussion of the
shortcomings of this reasoning, see LaFave, supra note
271, at 18-19.
" 399 U.S. at 52.
'Justice Harlan made a persuasive argument that
the search is the greater intrusion. 399 U.S. at 63 (Harlan,
J., concurring and dissenting). Chambers employs rationale
remarkably similar to that found in Justice White's dis-
senting opinion in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
770 (1969).
" 417 U.S. 583 (1973).
1m Id. at 590.
South Dakota v. Opperman,3t0 the Court further rea-
soned that automobiles are subject to pervasive
and continuing governmental regulation, and that
"as an everyday occurrence, police stop and ex-
amine vehicles when license plates or inspection
stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as
exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if




The lesser expectation of privacy rationale has
enabled the Court to limit the possible ramifica-
tions of the lesser-greater intrusion doctrine. In
United States v. Chadwick,3 1 2 for example, govern-
ment agents with probable cause seized a 200
pound double locked footlocker as it was about to
be placed in an automobile trunk outside a train
station. The agents took the footlocker to their
office, where they opened it sometime later and
discovered a large quantity of marijuana. The
government relied on the automobile cases to jus-
tify the warrantless search. On the surface this
argument had appeal, for one could certainly con-
tend, as the Court had in Chambers, that a war-
rantless detention of the footlocker while a search
warrant was obtained would have been just as
intrusive as the warrantless search. The Court,
however, relying on the expectation of privacy
rationale, found the warrantless search more intru-
sive. As the Court maintained:
Though surely a substantial infringement with re-
spondents' use and possession, the seizure did not
diminish respondents' legitimate expectation that
the footlocker's contents would remain private.
It was the greatly reduced expectation of privacy
in the automobile, coupled with the transportation
function of the vehicle, which made the Court in
Chambers unwilling to decide whether an immediate
search of an automobile, or its seizure and indefinite
immobilization, constituted a greater interference
with the rights of the owner. This is clearly not the
case with locked luggage.
313
Despite the sentiment expressed in Chadwick fa-
voring a warrant, one could still rely on the auto-
mobile cases in other contexts to justify proposed
exemptions from the warrant requirement. In Bar-
low's, for example, the government argued that the
automobile cases demonstrated that warrantless
searches are permissible where "core privacy inter-
ests are not ... implicated."314 The government
31(1 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
311 Id. at 368.
312 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
3 3 Id. at 14 n.8.
314 Brief for Appellants at 16, Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
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also maintained that OSHA inspections, like au-
tomobile searches, do not "implicate significant
privacy interests calling for the imposition of the
warrant requirement., 31 5 The Court answered this
argument in a footnote:
The fact that automobiles occupy a special category
in Fourth Amendment case law is by now beyond
doubt, due, among other factors, to the quick mo-
bility of a car, the registration requirements of both
the car and the driver, and the more available
opportunity for plainview observations of a car's
contents.... Even so, probable cause has not been
abandoned as a requirement for stopping and
searching an automobile 1 6
The attempts by the Court in Chadwick and
Barlow's to distinguish the automobile cases-
especially Chambers-do not appear acceptable. In-
stead, these cases only highlight what Justice Har-
lan recognized in Chambers itself: fidelity to the
warrant requirement dictates that a search warrant
be obtained for automobile searches except in exi-
gent circumstances. 317 Accordingly, for the sake of
consistency in fourth amendment theory, Chambers
should be overruled.
Upon consideration of this theory, it should first
be recognized that the Court's continuing refer-
ences to a car's mobility cannot support Chambers,
for the car in Chambers was no more mobile than
the footlocker in Chadwick. The only plausible ra-
tionale for the warrant exception in Chambers, there-
fore, is the one positing a lesser expectation of
privacy in cars than in other items or places. As-
suming for the moment the validity of this ration-
ale, the above statement in Barlow's that a search
of an automobile requires probable cause-
presumably in the traditional sense of that term-is
somewhat anomalous. The teaching of Camara,
Martinez-Fuerte, Mimms, and Barlow's318 is that lesser
intrusions upon privady interests do not require
full, traditional probable cause. It would seem,
then, that if the Court was really'serious about its
hypothesis of a reduced expectation of privacy in
automobiles, a strong presumptive case would exist
for balancing down the probable cause require-
ment. Yet, as the quote from Barlow's indicates, the
Court has not considered this possibility.
Moreover, the Court has not really explained
why a warrant is required in cases like Camara and
Barlow's, but not in automobile cases like Chambers.
3"' Id. at 27.
31698 S. Ct. at 1822 n.10.
317 399 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).S1 8 See section III A supra.
While the searches in the former cases did involve
premises, the Court in Camara explicitly relied upon
a rationale that administrative searches are not as
intrusive to privacy interests as criminal searches.
It would seem, therefore, especially after Katz, that
the nature of the threatened intrusion" not the
place of the intrusion, should be determinative in
assessing the need for a warrant. Still, as Justice
Stevens argued in Barlow's in the context of OSHA
inspections,s31 one might attempt to justify a war-
rant exception for cars by balancing the public
interest against the lesser nature of the intrusion.
The difficulty, however, is that if the limited intru-
siveness of a housing code inspection is sufficient to
provoke warrant protection, the intrusiveness of an
automobile search would hardly seem insufficient.
In any event, Barlow's, Tyler, and Mincey stressed
that a warrant is needed to control the scope of a
search, and this need is apparent in automobile
searches, where the officer must decide whether to
enter locked compartments, to open locked or
closed containers, to pull up carpeting, or even to
dismantle parts of the vehicle.2
°
The most telling point against Chambers, how-
ever, is.that the Court has not proved its claim that
expectations of privacy are lower in automobiles
than in most other places. Automobiles are indeed
regulated, but the fact that police may examine
license plates, inspection stickers, headlights, ex-
haust systems, and other such things3 2 ' hardly
proves that one has a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy in items held in the glove compartment, under
the seat, or in the trunk. Similarly, the fact that an
automobile travels public thoroughfares hardly
proves that one has a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy against governmental prying into concealed
areas.2m Barlow's seems to teach the very opposite:
neither governmental regulation nor an individ-
ual's limited disclosures of some aspects of an ac-
tivity give government a right ofwarrantless carte
319 See text at note 178 supra.
120 For 4n example of a car search that included lifting
up carpeting, see United States v. Edwards, 554 F.2d
1331 (5th Cir. 1977).
32 It is not at all clear, moreover, that police may
randomly stop automobiles to check such things. See
United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The Supreme Court may soon decide this issue.
Delaware v. Prouse, cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978).
2 In fact, one may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy against government surveillance, especially with
electronic tracking devices, while traveling on public
thoroughfares. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d
227 (1976) (en banc).
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blanche access to all the rest. Expectations of privacy
are not so easily diminished.
Finally, the Court's assertion that cars are not
repositories of personal belongings defies common
sense. Cars, like footlockers, are used to transport
personal possessions. One's most private posses-
sions, such as books, documents, diaries, photo-
graphs, and letters, and one's most valuable prop-
erty, such as jewelry, invariably wind up in one's
car at one point or another.3 2 Moreover, people
frequently leave valuables in glove compartments
and trunks while temporarily away from the car.
One need only think of freeway service plazas to
realize how much people depend upon the security
of a locked car for the protection of valuable
possessions. Indeed, an unattended, locked auto-
mobile undoubtedly provides more security for
possessions than an unattended, locked suitcase or
footlocker.
That the warrant requirement cannot legiti-
mately be excused in automobile cases under a
reduced expectation of privacy theory can be fur-
ther demonstrated with Chadwick hypotheticals.
Suppose the agents in that case waited to act until
the defendants drove away with the footlocker in
the trunk of their car. Suppose, moreover, that the
agents then stopped the car and arrested all of the
occupants. Several options may now be considered:
(1) the agents search the trunk of the car on the
spot, discovering the footlocker; (2) the agents, in
addition, open the footlocker; (3) the agents search
the trunk of the car on the spot but take the
footlocker back to their office, where they search it
without a warrant; (4) the agents do not search the
car on the spot but take it to their office, where
they search it, but not the footlocker, without a
warrant; (5) the agents search both the car and the
footlocker without a warrant at their office.
Under Chambers, the first and fourth hypotheti-
cals, involving searches of just the automobile,
•See United States v. Edwards, 554 F.2d 1331, 1338
(5th Cir. 1977):
Despite the wealth of language that privacy in
automobiles is less important than in other areas,
most members of our society must frequently use
automobiles to convey undeniably private papers
and effects. For example, the workload of this court
often requires judges to take their work home. The
automobile provides the usual mode for transport-
ing drafts of opinions, notations indicating the prob-
able outcome of submitted cases, and confidential
messages from other judges. To say that there is no
expectation of privacy in such papers, release of
which would constitute a dereliction of duty, would
be to ignore reality. And judges are of course not
alone in this regard. Virtually everyone must some-
times use an automobile to carry private papers.
would clearly constitute lawful police activity.32
The searches of the footlocker in the remaining
hypotheticals, however, are not so easy. Absent an
emergency-and, the arrest of the occupants ne-
gates an emergency rationale-Chadwick's rationale
about the privacy of footlockers would seem to
suggest that the warrantless searches of the foot-
locker could not be upheld, unless one's expecta-
tions of privacy in a footlocker rise and fall de-
pending upon whether the footlocker is in or out of
one's car.325 Moreover, to permit the footlocker to
be searched only when it is searched with the car,
as in the second and fifth hypotheticals, but not
when it is searched sometime later, as in the third
hypothetical,m would have "the perverse result of
allowing fortuitous circumstances to control the
outcome" of search and seizure cases.a27 In any
event, the message to police officers would be clear:
keep the footlocker in the car until you are ready
to search it. On the other hand, however, permit-
ting a warrantless search of the car both on the
spot and later at the station while prohibiting the
warrantless search of containers in the car would
make a mockery of the automobile exception. As
the hypotheticals thus demonstrate, something is
obviously askew, and that something is most ob-
viously Chambers, which permits a warrantless
search of a car even in the absence of exigent
circumstances.3
28
Chambers could be overruled without necessarily
"' See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam),
permitting the police to take the car back to the station
for a search. The dissent maintained that Chambers did
not control because the police in White could easily have
searched the car on the spot and thus had no need to
take the car to the station.
The search of the footlocker could not be upheld
under the search incident to arrest doctrine, for a locked
footlocker in a trunk of a car can hardly be deemed to be
within the defendant's immediate reach. Chimel v. Cal-
ifornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). But see United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 23 (1977) (Blackmun & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting).
m2' Lower court decisions seem to be making this very
distinction. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 558
F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stevie, 578
F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd en banc, 582 F.2d 1175
(1978). The Supreme Court may soon decide this issue.
See Arkansas v. Sanders, 262 AtM. 595, 559 S.W.2d 704
(1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 247 (1978).
327 Arguing that the officers could have searched the
footlocker in Chadwick without a warrant either by acting
a little earlier or a little later, the dissenters maintained
that the Court's holding turned on fortuitous circum-
stances. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)
(Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
3u Except for interests too inconsequential to merit
warrant protection, a warrant should be required for all
searches absent exigent circumstances. This would greatly
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overruling the more recent automobile case, Card-
well v. Lewis."2 In Cardwell, police seized a defend-
ant's car from a parking lot after interrogating him
all day at a nearby police station. Before the de-
fendant arrived at the station, the police had de-
veloped probable cause to believe that he commit-
ted murder by using his car to force the victim off
the road. In fact, the police had obtained an arrest
warrant, but not a warrant for the car, before the
defendant appeared at the station. Upon arresting
the defendant and seizing the car, the police took
some paint scrapings from the exterior and exam-
ined tire treads. The Court first concluded that the
examination of the car's exterior infringed at most
an "abstract and theoretical" expectation of pri-
vacy.m3 Turning to the warrantless seizure, which
enabled the police to examine the car's exterior,
the Court, in convoluted analysis, relied upon
Chambers. 3l
If Chambers was wrong, Cardwell's reliance upon
it cannot be defended. Yet, the result in Cardwell
simplify search and seizure law by eliminating the need
to identify specific exceptions, such as hot pursuit. Cool-
idge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), a plurality
opinion, stressed the exigent circumstances rationale of
warrant exceptions, but Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974), also a plurality.opinion, discussed in the text infra
read Coolidge as a case involving the seizure of an auto-
mobile from private property, not as a case standing for
the proposition that a search warrant should always be
obtained if there is time to do so.
Ifwarrantless automobile searches were permitted only
in exigent circumstances, the Chadwick hypotheticals
would become easy. Exigent circumstances would justify
a warrantless search of both the car and footlocker, but
absent such circumstances, both searches would require
a warrant. Cf United States v. Fontecha, 576 F.2d 601
(5th Cir. 1978) (applying emergency theory, rather than
automobile exception, to permit search of suitcase in
automobile).
2417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 592.
ms The Court emphasized both the reduced expecta-
tion of privacy in automobiles and the exigent circum-
stances rationale. Concerning the latter, the Court said:
"The fact that the car in Chambers was seized after being
stopped on a highway, whereas Lewis' car was seized
from a public parking lot, has little, if any, legal signifi-
cance. The same arguments and considerations of exi-
gency, immobilization on the spot, and posting a guard
obtain." Id. at 594-95. Of course, if the search is the
greater intrusion, posting a guard may be just what the
fourth amendment requires. See the discussion of Mincey
in note 299 and the accompanying text supra. In any
event, irkt-erms of the exigent circumstances rationale, the
Court was simply wrong in treating as irrelevant the fact
that the police had an entire day to obtain a warrant. See
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). To contend other-
wise would be to allow the police always to create their
own emergencies, and such emergencies would obviously
apply t6 houses as well as cars.
may be defended, for Cardwell did not have to rely
upon Chambers at all. The ultimate validity of
Cardwell depends upon the first part of its holding,
which upheld an examination of the car's exterior
without a warrant. Using precise language, the
Court stated the issue as "whether the examination
of an automobile's exterior upon probable cause
invades a right to privacy which the interposition
of a warrant requirement is meant to protect.' 2
As the Court recognized, the examination at issue
barely involved privacy interests. Of course, the
police activity did interfere with possessory prop-
erty interests, which the fourth amendment pro-
tects, but such interests may be adequately pro-
tected without prior judicial review. Furthermore,
nothing in Camara, Barlow's, or Tyler contravenes
this analysis. Administrative searches may not be
as intrusive as criminal searches, but they still
threaten privacy interests-not just property inter-
ests-much more than the police activity in Card-
well.
Once it 'is recognized that the "search" in Card-
well was too inconsequential in nature to justify
invocation of the warrant rule, the seizure of the
car becomes easy. Seizures as such only affect
possessory property interests; they affect privacy
interests only when their purpose is a subsequent
search. When possessory interests alone are at stake,
the Court has not normally required warrant pro-
tection. In G.M Leasing Corp. v. United States,33 for
example, the Court permitted the warrantless sei-
zure of several automobiles from public places in
partial satisfaction of a tax assessment. The Court
simply reasoned in one paragraph that the seizure
of the cars, unlike the entry into an office to seize
business records in the same case, "did not involve
any invasion of privacy."'  Similarly, the plain
view doctrine, which permits officers from a lawful
vantage point to make warrantless seizures, dem-
onstrates that possessory interests alone normally
do not demand warrant protectionP31 Finally, al-
332417 U.S. at 589.
"33429 U.S. 338 (1977).
"m Id. at 351.
"In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
466-72 (1971), a plurality of the Court held that plain
view seizures -are lawful only if the officers have come
upon the evidence inadvertently, although contraband,
stolen goods, and items dangerous in themselves seemed
to be exempted from this rule. The inadvertence rule
does not further what the Court described as the two
functions of the warrant requirement: eliminating
searches that are not supported by probable cause and
restricting the scope of searches that are. Id. at 466-67.
Rather, as Professor LaFave has demonstrated, the in-
advertence rule protects possessory property interests,
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though the issue is analytically distinct, it should
be noted that the Court has even upheld the
warrantless seizure of a person from a public
place.336 Only a skewed hierarchy of fourth amend-
ment values would demand a warrant for a seizure
qua seizure of an automobile but not of a person.
In short, a seizure of an automobile should only
implicate the warrant requirement if the seizure is
for the purpose of conducting a search that requires
prior judicial approval. The car in Chambers was
seized for the purpose of conducting such a search;
the car in Cardwell was not. To require a warrant
for the seizure in Cardwell, after concluding that
the subsequent warrantless examination was per-
missible, would be to contravene G. M Leasing, a
unanimous opinion, and the plain view doctrine.
Cardwell, therefore, can survive the much needed
demise of Chambers.
C. PARTICIPANT MONITORINC AND THE WARRANT RE-
QUIREMENT
Previous sections of this article have argued both
that participant monitoring by the government
implicates fourth amendment interests and that
such governmental activity should require, at a
minimum, reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. 3
7
The remaining question is whether the warrant
requirement should apply to participant monitor-
ing.
The issue need not be belabored. The preceding
discussion suggested that a search warrant should
be required unless either (1) the interests impli-
cated are too inconsequential to require warrant
protection M or (2) exigent circumstances make it
and nothing else. LaFave, supra note 271, at 24-26. But
see Weinreb, supra note 90, at 65 n.54.
In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), the
Court invalidated the warrantless seizure of items after
the police lawfully entered the premises to make an
arrest. The Court reasoned that the police had sufficient
time to procure a warrant. Had the officers engaged in a
search for the items, the Tnupiano rule would have been
correct. See note 328 supra. The Court's holding, however,
that the officers could enter the premises to seize the
defendants, but that once inside they could not seize
items in plain view, made the fourth amendment warrant
requirement appear silly. Trupiano was overruled after
just two years in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950), a decision that itself was overruled, on the
issue of the proper scope of a search incident to an arrest,
in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Trupiano,
however, has never been completely resurrected. In Cool-
idge, for example, the plurality said, "we do not 'reinstate'
Trupiano, since we cannot adopt all its implications." 403
U.S. at 482.
36 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
37 See sections II B 2 and III C supra.
33 See text at notes 332-36 supra.
impractical to get a warrant.m This term's cases
suggest that the Court will not readily find fourth
amendment interests too insignificant for warrant
protection. Reaffirming Camara, both Barlow's and
Tyler made it clear that the warrant requirement is
not limited to contexts demanding full, traditional
probable cause. Mincey, moreover, made it clear
that the Court will not adopt facile arguments of
exigent circumstances to establish new exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
Spying, as previously discussed, intrudes signifi-
cantly upon informational privacy, and it does this
whether or not electronic aids are employed. In
addition, spying rarely, if ever, occurs under cir-
cumstances making it impossible to obtain prior
judicial approval. A warrant requirement would
provide a neutral assessment of the requisite stan-
dard of cause. Just as significantly, a warrant re-
quirement would establish some parameters on the
scope of such activity.
The only conceivable argument against the war-
rant requirement in this context is distrust of the
magistrate's integrity.' 4 The Court, however, has
previously rejected the suggestion that a warrant
exception could be justified on this basis.e 1 In any
event, safeguards could be established, such as the
designation of certain judges to approve warrant
applications for participant monitoring. With this
argument eliminated, no basis exists for refusing to





A frustrated court once lamented that it would
take the mind of a medieval scholastic to unwind
the Supreme Court's search and seizure cases.34
This term's cases provide some hope that the long
overdue rethinking of search and seizure law can
proceed in a meaningful way, for they focus atten-
tion, sometimes with new insights, on the three
most basic questions of search and seizure law. In
analyzing this term's cases, and their logical rami-
fications, this article has argued that Hoffa v. United
See section IV B supra.
It might also be asserted that the warrant could not
particularly describe the place to be searched and items
to be seized. But this would be no more of a problem
than it is in third-party monitoring, where a warrant is
required. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
UiUnited States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297 (1972).
12 Franks v. Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2681 (1978).
343 United States v. Sutton, 341 F. Supp. 320, 322
(W.D. Tenn. 1972).
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States, United States v. White, United States v. Miller
and Chambers v. Maroney should be overruled. The
argument that several major cases should be over-
ruled has not been made lightly. Nevertheless, as
Professor LaFave once remarked, what we need,
above all, is "some assurance that [search and
seizure] cases are being decided in accordance with
a coherent analytical framework."'a This article
3" LaFave, supra note 271, at 27.
has attempted to show that the above named cases
are inconsistent with the analytical framework that
encompasses Katz and this term's cases. If the anal-
ysis in the article has been basically correct, the
overruling of the named cases can be avoided only
by overruling Katz and rejecting much of the rea-
soning in this term's cases. Either way, therefore, a
radical overhaul is required, unless we choose to
accept the inconsistencies and forego the goal of
analytic coherence.
1978]
